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A HISTORICAL REASSESSMENT OF CONGRESS’S
“POWER TO DISPOSE OF” THE PUBLIC LANDS
Jeffrey Schmitt*
The Property Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the “Power to Dispose” of fed-
eral land. Congress uses this Clause to justify permanent federal land ownership of approxi-
mately one-third of the land within the United States. Legal scholars, however, are divided as
to whether the original understanding of the Clause supports this practice. While many schol-
ars argue that the text and intent of the framers show that Congress has the power to perma-
nently own land within the states, others contend that these sources demonstrate that Congress
has a duty to dispose of all federal land not held pursuant to another enumerated power. This
scholarly debate has become increasingly important in recent years as a popular movement for
state ownership of federal land has reemerged in the West.
This Article argues that the debate over the history of the Property Clause should move
beyond the Founding. The original meaning of the text, the intent of the framers, and the
precedent of the early Supreme Court simply do not resolve the issue of whether Congress’s
Duty to Dispose includes the power to permanently retain land within the states. This Article
therefore provides the first detailed examination of how Congress’s Power to Dispose has been
understood since the Founding. It concludes that, although Westerners have repeatedly chal-
lenged Congress’s power when federal land policy has restricted western development, domi-
nant opinion has always supported a broad construction of Congress’s power. In fact, those
who favor federal land ownership have long argued that giving land to individual states
would violate a constitutional obligation for Congress to use the land for the common benefit.
When constitutional history is properly applied to Congress’s Power to Dispose, it strongly
supports federal land ownership.
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INTRODUCTION
The Property Clause of Article IV provides: “The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”1 Pursuant to this
authority, the federal government owns nearly one-third of the land within the
United States.2 A growing popular movement in the West, however, demands
that the federal government transfer ownership to the states.3 In 2012, for ex-
ample, Utah passed legislation purporting to require Congress to transfer title
to more than thirty million acres to the state.4 Since that time, politicians have
pushed for similar legislation in other states and in Congress.5 Radicals like
Ammon and Cliven Bundy, moreover, have galvanized Western support for the
movement and drawn national attention to the issue of federal land ownership.6
Although economic and political factors are also at play, the movement’s sup-
porters argue that federal land ownership within the states violates the original
meaning of the Constitution, the intent of the framers, and the equal sover-
eignty of the states.7
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
2. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Public Lands and the Federal Government’s Compact-Based “Duty
to Dispose”: A Case Study of Utah’s H.B. 148—The Transfer of Public Lands Act, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1133, 1137 (2013).
3. See Kirk Johnson, Siege Has Ended, but Battle Over Public Lands Rages On, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
14, 2017), https://perma.cc/9YJZ-MLL5. See generally Uma Outka, State Lands in Modern
Public Land Law, 36 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 152–62 (2017).
4. Transfer of Public Lands Act, H.B. 148, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012), codified at
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to 63L-6-104 (2017).
5. See Outka, supra note 3, at 152–60. R
6. See, e.g., Leah Sottile, Jury Acquits Ammon Bundy, Six Others for Standoff at Oregon Wildlife
Refuge, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/HEL2-FPH5.
7. See id.; George R. Wentz Jr. & John W. Howard, Americans in the Western States are Denied
Equal Rights, NAT’L REV., (Aug. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/HSN5-LR4W; JOHN W.
HOWARD ET AL., LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL CONSULTING SERVICES TEAM PRE-
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There is a long-standing scholarly debate over whether these arguments
are correct.8 Many legal scholars argue that the founding generation believed
that Congress had a constitutional duty to divest all federal land held under the
Property Clause.9 Under this reading of history, indefinite federal landowner-
ship was not seen as legitimate until attitudes towards federal power and the
environment changed during the twentieth century.10 Other scholars, however,
dispute this reading of history and argue that the founding generation and early
Supreme Court believed that Congress had the power to permanently own land
within the states.11 All of these scholars rely almost exclusively on the text,
evidence of framers’ intent, and early court precedent.
This Article argues that both sides of the debate are wrong to assume that
the Founding provides an answer. Like so many other concrete issues of mod-
ern constitutional law, the framing generation had no reason to discuss the
issue of whether Congress has the power to permanently own land within the
states. Although the federal government owned vast tracts of western land, it
owned no land within the existing states. Moreover, sources that address only
Congress’s power over the territories are inconclusive, because permanent fed-
eral ownership within the states arguably raises very different concerns about
state sovereignty and federalism. The original public meaning of the text, intent
of the founding generation, and precedent of the early Supreme Court are
therefore inconclusive.
When the original meaning of the Constitution does not resolve a con-
crete issue of law, the Court and most theories of constitutional interpretation
give significant weight to longstanding historical practices. This Article there-
PARED FOR THE UTAH COMMISSION FOR THE STEWARDSHIP OF PUBLIC LANDS (2015),
https://perma.cc/E6MM-4CGN.
8. Although scholars vigorously debate the history, modern legal doctrine strongly supports
federal land ownership. See ROBERT B. KEITER & JOHN C. RUPLE, WALLACE STEGNER
CTR. FOR LAND, RES., & ENV’T, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
LANDS MOVEMENT, WHITE PAPER NO. 2014-2, at 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/Q23Q-
BA3C; cf. Nick Lawton, Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of Federal
Lands, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17–34 (2014).
9. See Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding
Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693, 694 (1981); Robert E. Hardwicke,
Carl Illig & C. Perry Patterson, The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L. REV.
398, 419–23 (1948); Kochan, supra note 2, at 1145–49, 1159–65; Carolyn M. Landever, R
Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Public
Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 578–79 (1995); Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention
and the Constitution’s Property Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
327, 377 (2005); C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories
and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43, 72–73 (1949).
10. See Landever, supra note 9, at 578–79, 588–89. R
11. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the ‘Classic’ Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617
(1985); Dale Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV.
495 (1985).
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fore relies on previously overlooked congressional debates and historical schol-
arship to provide the first detailed account of how Congress’s Power to Dispose
has been understood throughout constitutional history.12 Unlike many other
modern issues, the question of whether Congress can permanently own land
within the states has been asked and answered several times throughout history.
Since the issue first arose in the early nineteenth century, the dominant view
has always been that Congress’s power to own land is limited only by a duty to
act for the common benefit. Although prominent Westerners have challenged
this view whenever Congress has limited disposal or resource use—particularly
in the 1830s, 1930s, 1970s, and today—the argument that Congress has a duty
to dispose of federal land within the states has never been widely accepted.
Post-Founding constitutional history therefore strongly supports a broad con-
struction of Congress’s Power to Dispose that includes the power to perma-
nently own land within a state.
Ironically, although the constitutional argument against federal land own-
ership relies heavily on history, there is strong historical support for the idea
that Congress should not transfer land to the states. Ever since lands were first
ceded to the national government by the original states, Congress’s power has
been understood to be limited by an obligation to act for the common benefit.
Whenever Westerners have claimed that the states are entitled to the land
within their borders, defenders of federal land policy have argued that the land
12. During the final editing stages of this Article several new articles were posted on SSRN or
published that discuss the history of constitutional arguments over public lands. See Gregory
Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (analyzing how
title to property became federalized in the early republic); John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public
Lands Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 499 (2018) (responding to the legal analysis pre-
pared in support of Utah’s legislation); Ian Bartrum, Searching for Cliven Bundy: The Consti-
tution and Public Lands, 2 NEV. L.J.F. 67 (2018) (focusing on and refuting the argument that
the federal government has a contractual obligation to divest federal lands after statehood).
Moreover, several other law review articles discuss the history of post-Founding federal
land policy. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Dis-
contents: Lessons from the Malheur Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781, 794–809 (2016); Law-
ton, supra note 8, at 5–9. There is also a rich body of historical work on public land policy. R
See generally JOHN R. VAN ATTA, SECURING THE WEST: POLITICS, PUBLIC LANDS, AND
THE FATE OF THE OLD REPUBLIC, 1785–1850 (2014); DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC
LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS (1984); PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND
LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968); RAYNOR G. WELLINGTON, THE POLITICAL AND SEC-
TIONAL INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLIC LANDS, 1828–1842 (1914).
This Article differs in many important respects. In particular, this Article focuses on the
narrow issue of whether the Property Clause has historically been understood to justify in-
definite federal landownership within the states. This Article also provides the most detailed
account of constitutional arguments around public lands outside the courts. Finally, although
each of the 2018 articles agrees that federal landownership is constitutional, this Article
uniquely develops the arguments that: (1) the common benefit principle has historically been
understood to be a significant limitation on Congress’s power; and (2) the equal sovereignty
principle is historically sound but fully consistent with federal land ownership.
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must be used for the benefit of all rather than any individual state or interest.
Today, environmental and outdoor recreation groups make the same argument
when they assert that federal land is an “American birthright” that “belongs to
all of us.”13
History also refutes the idea that federal land ownership violates the prin-
ciple of equal state sovereignty because it is concentrated in the western states.
Westerners advanced this same argument in the early nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Defenders of the federal land policy responded by distinguishing land
ownership from sovereignty over the land. Federal ownership, they asserted, no
more infringed on state sovereignty than private land ownership. Although fed-
eral and private ownership limit state control of the land, the state retains some
regulatory power in both instances. The concentration of federal land within
the western states, they further asserted, no more violated the principle of equal
state sovereignty than the fact that Congress’s power to lay tariffs had greater
implications in the East.
Court precedent supports these conclusions. Early cases broadly interpret
Congress’s power over the territories and adopt the common benefit principle.14
When the Court finally reached the issue of Congress’s power over land within
the states in the early 1900s, it adopted the same broad interpretation that
Congress and the executive had operated under for the past century.15 By mid-
century, it explicitly rejected the equal sovereignty argument.16 In 1974, the
Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico17 broadly asserted that Congress’s power over
federal land in New Mexico is “without limitation[ ].”18
The remainder of this Article is divided into five parts. Part I examines the
text of the Property Clause, the framers’ intent, and the proper role of history in
the Clause’s interpretation. Part II recounts the history of the public lands
through the Founding. Part III provides the first in-depth account of the
meaning of Congress’s Power to Dispose prior to the Civil War, focusing on
several key congressional debates. Part IV analyzes subsequent history and pre-
cedent on Congress’s power to own land. Part V summarizes the history dis-
cussed in Parts I through IV and applies it to the modern debate over
transferring federal land to the states.
13. Congress Puts Public Lands in the Crosshairs, ACCESS FUND (Jan. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/
JBM3-4L6N; Annika Kristiansen, This Land Was Made for You and Me, SIERRA CLUB (Feb.
6, 2017), https://perma.cc/9HFH-NH94.
14. See infra Section III.E.
15. See infra Section IV.B.
16. See infra notes 410–13 and accompanying text. R
17. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
18. Id. at 539; see infra notes 406–13 and accompanying text. R
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I. INTERPRETING THE PROPERTY CLAUSE: TEXT, INTENT, AND THE
NEED FOR A MORE COMPLETE HISTORY
At a minimum, conventional constitutional interpretation includes an
analysis of text, structure, original intent, history, and precedent.19 The text and
structure of the Constitution, however, do not resolve the issue of whether the
Property Clause grants the federal government the power to permanently own
land within the states. Although scholarship on the history of the Property
Clause has focused almost exclusively on its original meaning in 1787, the
framers’ intent is similarly unhelpful. Because these traditional sources of con-
stitutional meaning are inconclusive, an analysis of Post-Founding history is
needed.
A. The Text of the Property Clause
The Property Clause of Article IV provides: “The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”20 Samuel Johnson’s
A Dictionary of the English Language, which is commonly seen as the most au-
thoritative Founding Era dictionary,21 defines “To dispose of” as: “7. To apply
to any purpose; to transfer to any person; 8. To put in the hands of another; 9.
To give away; 10. To employ to any end; 11. To place in any condition; 12. To
put away by any means.”22 “Territory” is defined as “[l]and; country; dominion;
district,” and “Property” is defined, in relevant part, as a “[p]ossession held in
one’s own right.”23 Giving the text its dictionary meaning, a reader in the late
eighteenth century therefore could have understood it to grant Congress the
authority to use, sell, give away, and regulate federal land and other possessions.
Because land that is retained and regulated is “disposed of,” the text does not
clearly resolve the issue of whether the federal government can permanently
retain land within a state.
Although when viewed in isolation the Property Clause does not require
Congress to sell or transfer federal land, Natelson argues that such a require-
ment can be inferred from the structure of the Constitution.24 Under this view,
19. For more on the standard forms of constitutional argument, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
21. See Gregory Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine
the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 359 (2014).
22. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed., London, Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1792). Definitions 1–6 apply to the phrase “to dispose” rather than “to
dispose of.” Id. Although “Power” has twelve definitions, the first is “[c]ommand; authority;
dominion; influence.” Id.
23. Id.
24. See Natelson, supra note 9, at 364. R
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because the Property Clause does not explicitly grant the federal government
the power to own or acquire land, such a power can only be derived from the
powers enumerated in Article I. Without the power to own, Natelson argues,
the “power” to dispose becomes a mandatory duty to sell or transfer.25 Under
this narrow reading of Congress’s power, for example, the federal government
could permanently own a military base or post office because Article I grants
Congress the power to provide for the common defense and to establish post
offices.26 Because nothing in Article I would similarly support the establishment
of national parks, however, this narrow interpretation would imply a duty to sell
or transfer all park and forest land to the states or private parties.
The text, however, need not be read so narrowly. Just as the power to
indefinitely own land to form a post office can be implied from Article I, Sec-
tion 8, the power to acquire and permanently own national parks could be im-
plied from the Property Clause itself. If Congress has the power to “dispose”
and “make needful Rules and Regulations,” then it must also have the power to
own land. The Property Clause therefore only makes sense against a back-
ground of federal land ownership.27 In fact, at the time of the Founding, the
federal government owned vast tracts of western land, and the Confederation
Congress extensively regulated its sale and use.28 Regardless of whether the
power derives from the Property Clause, is implied from the structure of the
Constitution, or is an inherent incident of national sovereignty, it is reasonable
to conclude that the federal government has the power to own land.29
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
27. The narrow interpretation, moreover, would render the Property Clause superfluous. For
example, if Article I grants Congress the power to acquire and own land to build a post
office, then it would likewise implicitly grant Congress the power to regulate the use of the
post office land and sell or transfer the land when no longer needed.
28. See infra Section II.
29. The federal government’s power to acquire new land, however, is arguably distinguishable. It
could be argued that, although the Property Clause presupposes the existence of federal land,
the text does not similarly imply that the federal government has the power to acquire new
land. In fact, Thomas Jefferson struggled with the constitutionality of the Louisiana
Purchase because he was sympathetic to this reading of the text, and Justice Taney infa-
mously held that the Property Clause did not apply to newly acquired land in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399 (1857). See, e.g., Robert Knowles, The Balance of
Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States’ Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV.
343 (2002); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Aug. 9, 1803), in 10 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON IN TWELVE VOLUMES, FEDERAL EDITION 28 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1905). As a textual matter, however, the power to acquire land could be
implied from various sources, including the Property Clause, the treaty power, the power to
declare war, and inherent national sovereignty. A full discussion of the federal government’s
power to acquire land is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the federal
government’s power to own and retain land within a state. Even if the acquisition of new
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Some scholars, however, contend that the Property Clause cannot justify
permanent land ownership within a state when read in light of the Enclave
Clause.30 The Enclave Clause grants Congress “exclusive Legislation” over the
District of Columbia and “all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legisla-
ture of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”31 These schol-
ars contend that, because the Enclave Clause clearly authorizes federal land
ownership within the states, it necessarily implies that the federal government
cannot own land within the states if its requirements are not met.32
The Enclave Clause, however, does not require such a narrow interpreta-
tion of the Property Clause. First, each clause refers to a different geographical
area: the Property Clause refers to the land of the United States, which, as
discussed below, was primarily located outside of the states at the time of Rati-
fication, whereas the Enclave Clause refers to land within the states, including
the states that existed at the time of Ratification. Second, the clauses arguably
grant Congress different levels of regulatory authority.33 Given these differ-
ences, the Enclave Clause’s relatively clear grant of authority to permanently
own land within the states implies nothing about whether Congress can do the
same under the Property Clause.
In sum, the original meaning of the text of the Property Clause does not
foreclose the possibility that Congress could permanently own land within the
states. Moreover, notwithstanding scholarly arguments to the contrary, the text
implies that Congress has the power to own land under the Property Clause.
The text, however, says nothing—explicitly or implicitly—about whether Con-
gress has the power to either (1) own land within a state under the Property
Clause or (2) do so on a permanent basis.
B. Original Intent and the Property Clause
Original intent also provides few answers. Because the United States did
not own significant amounts of land within a state until Ohio was admitted to
the Union in 1803, it should be no surprise that this issue was ignored during
the Founding Era. What little evidence exists, however, indicates that the
land was unconstitutional, this would not necessarily dictate that federal landholding within
an existing state is unconstitutional today.
30. See Landever, supra note 9, at 578; Patterson, supra note 9, at 60–61. R
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
32. See Landever, supra note 9, at 578; Patterson, supra note 9, at 60–61. R
33. The Property Clause grants Congress the power to make “all needful Rules and Regula-
tions,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, while the Enclave Clause grants Congress a power of
“exclusive legislation,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. A full discussion of Congress’s regulatory power
under these Clauses, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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founding generation expected Congress to own land after statehood. This evi-
dence is explored below in Part II.
Before analyzing the historical record, however, it is important to first dis-
tinguish between original intent and original expected uses of the powers that
were intended. When scholars search for original intent, they ask what the
framers understood the text to mean. In the words of Keith Whittington: “The
point of originalist inquiry is not to ask Madison what he would do if he were a
justice on the Supreme Court hearing the case at issue. The point is to deter-
mine what principle Madison and his contemporaries adopted, and then to
figure out whether and how that principle applies to the current case.”34
Proponents of the narrow view of the Property Clause often misuse origi-
nal intent. They frequently argue that, because the framing generation expected
Congress to eventually sell the federal lands, Congress’s powers under the
Property Clause should be construed narrowly to require divestiture.35 In mak-
ing this argument, however, they do not cite to a single authority stating that
the founding generation thought Congress was constitutionally required to dis-
pose of federal lands. Instead, they rely on the common expectation that Con-
gress would exercise its Power to Dispose by selling and transferring the land
for private development.36
This argument, however, conflates original intent with how the Founders
expected Congress to use its powers. Even for those who care about intent, it is
only the former that is important. We care about original intent because the
Founders’ understanding of constitutional meaning—not their predictions
about future policy—are important. The argument for the narrow view, for
34. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 611 (2004).
35. See sources cited supra note 9. This is also a popular argument in the land transfer move- R
ment. See sources cited infra note 426. R
36. The report on the constitutionality of Utah’s land transfer legislation, for example, discusses
early federal land policy at length and contends that, because its goal was the private devel-
opment of the land for productive uses, Congress should be restrained to this same goal
today. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 7, at 114–18. Nowhere in the 150-page report, however, R
is there any quotation from a Founding Father explicitly stating that the federal government
lacks the power to permanently own land within a state. See id. Others similarly conflate
early federal policy with the early understanding of Congress’s constitutional powers. See,
e.g., William Perry Pendley, The Federal Government Should Follow the Constitution and Sell
Its Western Lands, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/VMZ3-94Z4 (“The
Founding Fathers intended all lands owned by the federal government to be sold.”);
Landever, supra note 9, at 567, 576 (“That the unappropriated lands in each new state, as in R
each existing state, would ultimately be placed in private hands was generally understood
throughout most of the country’s first century.”); Natelson, supra note 9, at 368 (“There is R
another piece of evidence that disposal of property not held for enumerated purposes was to
be mandatory: the universal expectation that the lands would, in fact, be disposed of.”); cf.
Kochan, supra note 2, at 1158–60 (arguing that Utah’s enabling act requires Congress to sell R
or transfer all federal land within the state because Utah agreed to the conditions of the act
with the expectation that Congress would do so).
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example, is akin to arguing that, because the framers did not expect that we
would ever declare war on Sweden, Congress lacks the power to do so. To take
another example, even if it could be demonstrated that the framers never
thought that Congress would impose a tariff as high as sixty percent, this would
have no implications for Congress’s power to do so. What matters is the fram-
ers’ understanding of Congress’s powers, not the legislation that the framers
expected Congress to enact. The Founders’ expectation that Congress would
decide to sell the federal lands to private parties thus tells us nothing about
whether they thought Congress had a constitutional obligation to do so.
C. Post-Ratification History and Constitutional Interpretation
When the text and original intent do not resolve a concrete issue of consti-
tutional law, constitutional interpretation often turns to post-ratification his-
tory.37 As the Court recently explained in NLRB v. Noel Canning,38 the “Court
has treated [historical] practice as an important interpretive factor even when
the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that
practice began after the founding era.”39 Descriptive accounts of how courts
actually decide constitutional cases report that post-ratification history is nearly
as important as the history of the Founding.40
Post-ratification history is also important to most academic theories of
interpretation, including originalist theories.41 Broadly defined, an originalist
theory is one that holds that the original understanding of the Constitution
37. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2106–09 (2015) (using post-ratification history to
“confirm” that the President has the exclusive power to recognize a foreign state); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“ ‘[T]raditional ways of conducting government
. . . give meaning’ to the Constitution.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply embedded traditional
ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they
give meaning to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception
of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disre-
gard the gloss which life has written upon them.”))); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655,
689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a
proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character.”); McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“An exposition of the constitution, deliberately
established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been advanced,
ought not to be lightly disregarded.”).
38. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
39. Id. at 2560.
40. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 651–53 (2013); Sara Aronchick Solow & Barry Friedman, How to Talk About the Con-
stitution, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 69, 78, 81–83, 86–88 (2013).
41. Scholarship on the history of the Property Clause has been heavily influenced by originalism.
See generally Natelson, supra note 9. R
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carries the force of binding law.42 Today, most originalists search for the origi-
nal public meaning of the text, i.e., the meaning that an ordinary reader at the
time of the Founding would attach to the document.43 Because the text of the
Constitution is often vague and ambiguous, however, many originalists concede
that original public meaning cannot answer every concrete issue of constitu-
tional law.44
Although originalists focus primarily on the Founding, post-ratification
history is also relevant. According to Justice Scalia, post-ratification history is “a
critical tool of constitutional interpretation” because it provides strong evidence
of original public meaning.45 Historical practices can also be important to
originalist theories of construction when the original public meaning of the text
does not provide a concrete answer.46
Many scholars who advance non-originalist or “living constitutionist” the-
ories of interpretation also place great weight on post-ratification history. Ac-
cording to David Strauss’s theory of common law constitutional interpretation,
for example, “the Constitution should be followed [in part] because its provi-
sions reflect judgments that have been accepted by many generations in a vari-
ety of circumstances.”47 Barry Friedman, moreover, “argues for grounding
constitutional interpretation in all of our constitutional history, rather than in
the history of the Founding alone.”48 Larry Kramer similarly argues that “to
42. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1, 20 (2011).
43. Whittington, supra note 34, at 609–10. When originalism first emerged as a theory of con- R
stitutional interpretation, scholars searched the original intent of the framers and ratifiers.
So-called “new originalists” shifted their analysis to original meaning in part because of the
problems associated with finding and applying original intent. See, e.g., id. at 610–11; Randy
E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620–21 (1999).
44. See Barnett, supra note 43, at 645; Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, R
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 547 (2003); Whittington, supra note 34, at 611–12; Solum, supra R
note 42, at 25–26. R
45. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008) (relying on nineteenth-century
history to determine the original public meaning of the Second Amendment).
46. Originalist Lawrence Solum even goes so far as to say that “an originalist might accept that a
long-standing historical practice that has generated substantial reliance might be lawful, even
though it turns out to be contrary to original meaning.” Solum, supra note 42, at 35. John R
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, moreover, argue that the text should be interpreted using
original methods of interpretation. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rap-
paport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). According to Caleb Nelson, the Founders
thought that, when the text was unclear, deliberate actions from Congress or the judiciary
would “settle” or “liquidate” constitutional meaning and thus provide a “permanent exposi-
tion of the constitution.” Nelson, supra note 44, at 527–29 (quoting James Madison). R
47. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891
(1996).
48. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7
(1998).
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conceive the Constitution as a dynamic framework of evolving institutions and
restraints makes history central to the interpretive enterprise. But the history
that matters is not confined to the Founding, or to specific Founding mo-
ments.”49 Bruce Ackerman goes so far as to argue that widely accepted constitu-
tional norms can change constitutional meaning even without formal
amendments.50
In sum, post-Founding history is important. Parts III and IV therefore
examine post-ratification history and argue that it overwhelmingly supports a
broad view of Congress’s power under the Property Clause that includes the
power to permanently own land within the states. History further demonstrates
that permanent federal land ownership is fully consistent with the equal sover-
eignty principle and that transferring federal land to the states would violate
Congress’s constitutional duty to use the land for the common benefit.
II. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION TO THE FOUNDING
By the time of the Founding, the federal government owned vast tracts of
land and a national consensus had emerged around strict federal control of
western settlement. The decision of how and when to dispose of the lands was
thus understood to reside exclusively with Congress. Because federal lands were
located outside the borders of the original states, however, the specific issue of
whether the federal government has the power to indefinitely own and control
land within the states under the Property Clause was neither raised nor
resolved.
A. The Confederation Period
Many of the original colonies had claims to vast tracts of land in the West.
Through charters and land grants, the British Crown granted Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia ter-
ritory extending to the Pacific Ocean.51 During the Revolution, states that
lacked such territorial claims demanded that the western lands be ceded to the
federal government for the common benefit.52 In 1776, Maryland’s legislature
resolved that, because the public lands were obtained with “the blood and trea-
sure of the United States, such lands ought to be considered as a common
49. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1638
(1997).
50. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACK-
ERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
51. JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES: LAW
AND POLICY 82 (2d ed. 2009).
52. Id. at 83.
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stock.”53 Maryland later threatened to not ratify the Articles of Confederation
unless the western lands were ceded and sold to retire the national war debt.54
New York thus relinquished its western land claims in 1780.55
To encourage further cessions from the states, Congress passed a resolu-
tion in October of 1780 that embodied an emerging national consensus on
territorial policy.56 The resolution provided that any territory ceded to the fed-
eral government would be “settled and formed into distinct republican states”
that would “become members of the federal union” with the same “rights of
sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the [original] states.”57 Congress
thus promised that the United States would have no colonies or dependent
provinces. The resolution further guaranteed that the ceded lands would be
“disposed of for the common benefit of the United States.”58
Soon after Congress passed the resolution, Virginia, which had the most
significant western land claims, passed an act of cession in 1781.59 Like Con-
gress’s 1780 resolution, Virginia’s act of cession stated that Congress could take
the land only on the condition that it be held as a “common fund for the use
and benefit” of all states and disposed of only “for that purpose, and for no
other use or purpose whatsoever.”60 Virginia’s act of cession further provided
that the new states formed from the territory must have the same “rights of
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other States.”61 By accepting
Virginia’s cession in 1784, Congress thus again committed to use the territories
for the common benefit and admit new states on a condition of equality.
When the Continental Congress began to legislate for the territories, its
policy was designed to encourage development. For early Americans, areas of
undeveloped wilderness were “barren wilds.”62 Through cultivation, they
thought, the territories would be transformed “from a savage wilderness, to a
53. BLAKE A. WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM THE INDIANS: JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH
AND THE HISTORY OF NATIVE LAND RIGHTS 110–16 (2012).
54. Id.
55. See Arthur Bestor, Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: The Attainment of Consen-
sus, 1754–1784, in THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 13, 20 (John Porter Bloom ed.,
1973).
56. See id. at 21.
57. See id. (quoting 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 915–16 (1910)).
58. Id.
59. Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal
Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2001). By 1802, each of the
landholding states had ceded its territory to the federal government. See RASBAND ET AL.,
supra note 51, at 84. R
60. GATES, supra note 12, at 52. R
61. Id.
62. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDI-
NANCE 8 (1987) (quoting JONATHAN LORING AUSTIN, AN ORATION, DELIVERED JULY 4,
1786 (Boston, Peter Edes 1786)).
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civilized field that shall blossom like the rose.”63 Under eighteenth century
thinking, natural resources were useful only when developed, and such cultiva-
tion was “interesting, noble and august.”64 Development by white settlers was
even used as a justification for taking lands from Native Americans so that
those lands could be used to their full commercial potential.65 Americans thus
universally expected that, when territory was disposed for the common good, it
would be sold to private parties for cultivation.66
Unorganized settlement of the western territories, however, was perceived
to be a danger to the Union. Without an active federal plan, settlers would
haphazardly claim prime lands across the territories. Policymakers worried that
diffuse settlements would become politically and economically isolated from the
Union, provoke conflict with Native Americans, and even look to European
powers for protection.67 In 1784, George Washington expressed a common fear
when he stated that Westerners could “become a distinct people from us, have
different views, different interests,” and “be a formidable and dangerous
neighbour.”68
Revenue from land sales was also needed to relieve the country of the
onerous debt incurred during the Revolutionary War.69 People generally ex-
pected that Congress would systematically sell the public lands to retire the
nation’s debts.70 As Congress stated in a 1784 resolution, it considered “vacant
territory as a capital resource.”71
To address these issues, historian John R. Van Atta asserts that “[t]he land
system that emerged in the 1780s reflected nation building by design.”72 Policy-
makers agreed that effective government was needed to bring order to the terri-
tories.73 Disposal of the public land, they further believed, needed to be strictly
63. Id. at 157, n.30 (quoting an anonymous correspondent to CONN. COURANT, Nov. 7, 1785,
at 3).
64. Id. at 37 (quoting New-York, July 20, FREEMAN’S J., July 26, 1786, at 3). Territorial Gover-
nor Arthur St. Clair told a crowd that “the ‘pleasure’ of seeing ‘vast forests converted into
arable fields, and cities rising in places which were lately the habitations of wild beasts’ was
‘something like that’ of witnessing ‘creation’ itself.” Id. at 113 (quoting Governor Arthur St.
Clair, Address at Marietta (July 15, 1788), in 2 WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, THE ST. CLAIR
PAPERS 53–56 (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1882)).
65. Id. at 37.
66. See Natelson, supra note 9, at 368–74. R
67. ONUF, supra note 62, at 4–5. R
68. See Andrew R.L. Clayton, Radicals in the “Western World”: The Federalist Conquest of Trans-
Appalachian North America, in FEDERALISTS RECONSIDERED 81–82 (Doron Ben-Atar &
Barbara B. Oberg eds., 1998).
69. See, e.g., VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 17–18. R
70. See FELLER, supra note 12, at 6. R
71. Id.
72. VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 6. R
73. See id. at 43, 242.
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limited to ensure that settlements were compact, interconnected, and strategi-
cally located.74 Extensive federal control over western settlement was seen as
essential.75
The Confederation Congress therefore passed several ordinances regulat-
ing the territories, even though it lacked any authority to do so in the Articles
of Confederation. The Ordinance of 1784, as designed by Thomas Jefferson,
specified boundaries for new states and authorized settlers to establish territorial
governments by “adopting the constitution and laws of any of the original
States.”76 The Ordinance also promised statehood to any new division that ob-
tained a population equal to that of the smallest existing state.77 To encourage
settlement, the new western states were guaranteed an equal place in the
Union.78
In the Land Act of 1785, the Confederation Congress developed a system
to strategically sell the public lands. Rather than opening all land for settle-
ment, the Land Act required all land to be surveyed before sale, with property
lines following a grid system.79 The gradual nature of the survey system not only
stabilized the market by limiting supply, but it also forced settlers to purchase
land near each other.80 By clustering land sales near transportation routes, fed-
erally managed settlement could simultaneously promote commercial connec-
tions with the East, discourage encroachments on lands held by Native
Americans, and make defense more practical in the event of conflict.81 Under
this national vision for the West, gradual federal sales to a growing population
would drive the settlement of a politically and economically interconnected
region.
To determine price, the Land Act utilized an auction system with a mini-
mum price per acre. This system allowed Congress to receive fair market value
for land sales, thus benefiting the nation rather than land speculators or squat-
ters. By keeping land prices high, Congress not only hoped to maximize federal
revenue, but also to attract settlers of economic means who would be more
likely to invest in the land and participate in republican government.82
The Ordinance of 1784, however, did not prove to be an effective system
for the political organization of the territories. While Jefferson had assumed
there would be rapid emigration to the territories by a population desiring self-
74. See id. at 43, 51; ONUF, supra note 62, at 5–6. R
75. See VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 51. R
76. ONUF, supra note 62, at 46. R
77. Id.
78. Id. at xix.
79. Id. at 40–41.
80. Id. at 35, 45. Squatters and speculators were thus problematic because they often took only
the prime lands in a region, leaving the rest undeveloped and unconnected. Id. at 40–42.
81. Id. at 5–7.
82. See VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 36. R
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government, settlers were deterred by the lack of an effective government and
means of self-defense from war with Native Americans.83 On July 13, 1786,
Congress thus adopted a report calling for a “colonial” system of temporary
government in the territories.84
When the Confederation Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance in
1787, it took a much more active role in governing the federal territories. In the
early stages of development, a congressionally appointed governor controlled
the territory.85 When 60,000 free inhabitants lived within a district, it could
submit a constitution to Congress and apply for statehood.86 Up to five states
could be created from the territory, and the Ordinance guarantees that such
states would be admitted “on an equal footing” with the existing states.87
The Northwest Ordinance also states that Congress would retain owner-
ship over the public lands after statehood. It provides:
The Legislatures of those districts, or new States, shall never interfere
with the primary disposal of the Soil by the United States in Con-
gress Assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find neces-
sary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers. No
tax shall be imposed on lands the property of the United States.88
The drafters of the Ordinance apparently saw no conflict between this provi-
sion and the guarantee that the new states would be admitted on an equal
footing.
The Northwest Ordinance, moreover, was no ordinary statute. It was
widely considered to be a charter for the territories analogous to the British
charters for the original colonies.89 The Ordinance also provided a blueprint for
all future territories. The First Congress quickly reenacted it after Ratification
to ensure that it remained good law.
In sum, by the time of the Founding, a national consensus had emerged
around public land policy. The federal government, rather than the individual
states, would own the public domain and exercise strict control over the settle-
ment of all western lands. Moreover, because the land belonged to the entire
83. ONUF, supra note 62, at 52–54. R
84. Id. at 50.
85. The Northwest Ordinance is available in full at Transcript of Northwest Ordinance (1787),
OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, https://perma.cc/XZ76-C2QN. A popularly-elected assembly was
added when a district had 5000 free male inhabitants. Id. § 9. The Ordinance, however,
directly prohibited slavery, id. art. 6, and guaranteed certain civil liberties, see, e.g., id. arts.
1–3.
86. Id. art. 5.
87. Id.
88. Id. art. 4.
89. See ONUF, supra note 62, at xx, 72. Onuf explains: “This usage permitted the identification R
of new states with old: the American colonies in the West would recapitulate the colonial
experience of the original states and then be recognized as equals.” Id. at xx, 49–50.
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country, the federal government had an obligation to use the public domain for
the common benefit rather than for the benefit of any one state or special inter-
est. Finally, any new state formed from the public lands would be admitted to
the Union on an equal footing with the original states.
B. The Founding
The records of the Constitutional Convention contain little debate over
the Property Clause. On August 18, 1787, a proposal was referred to the com-
mittee of detail to grant Congress the powers “to dispose of unappropriated
lands of the United States.”90 Gouverneur Morris later proposed language that
would become the modern Property Clause, which was adopted with no de-
bate.91 In full, the Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States.”92
Perhaps the most that can be said of the Founders’ intent is that they
thought the Property Clause authorized Congress to reenact the Northwest
Ordinance and pass similar legislation. In Federalist 38, Madison pointed out
that the Confederation Congress had created territorial governments and dis-
posed of the federal lands “without the least color of constitutional authority.”93
Madison, however did not mean this as a criticism of Congress, because it
“could not have done otherwise.”94 Instead, the Confederation Congress’s lack
of authority to pass the Northwest Ordinance was “an alarming proof of the
danger resulting from a government which does not possess regular powers
commensurate to its objects.”95 In Federalist 7, Alexander Hamilton likewise
stressed the danger posed by territorial disputes between the states without fed-
eral control over the public lands and pointed out that revenue from land sales
could be used to retire the war debt.96 There is no record of any founding father
or anti-federalist criticizing the Northwest Ordinance’s claim to continued fed-
eral land ownership after statehood.97 Nor is there any hint that such federal
ownership was inconsistent with the promise of equal statehood.
90. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 321 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
91. Id. at 466.
92. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.




96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
97. According to Appel, “the antifederalists generally ignored the Property Clause and the
power of the federal government over the West.” Appel, supra note 59, at 28. R
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Aside from the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, however, there is
little mention of Congress’s power to own land within a state during the
Founding Period. This is likely because, at that time, the federal government
owned no such land.98 Founding Era sources therefore cannot resolve the issue
of whether the federal government has the power to permanently own land
within a state pursuant to the Property Clause.
III. THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY: RATIFICATION TO CIVIL WAR
In the 1820s and 1830s, however, Western politicians argued for the first
time that Congress lacked the power to permanently own land within the
states. In doing so, they advanced arguments that are strikingly similar to those
advanced today in favor of the narrow view of Congress’s power to own land
within a state. In a series of previously overlooked debates, leading statesmen
from each section and political party advanced three basic principles. First, be-
cause the land belonged to the entire country, the federal government had an
obligation to use the public domain for the common benefit rather than for the
benefit of any one state or special interest. Second, Congress’s power to own
land was otherwise unlimited and included the power to retain land within a
state and restrict it from sale indefinitely. Third, federal land ownership within
the states was fully consistent with equal state sovereignty.
A. Early Public Land Policy
Early federal land policy reflected a bipartisan consensus on these three
principles. Because land sales generated revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury
had a large role in setting land policy. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton
valued the western lands as a source of revenue and collateral to help establish
the country’s credit; however, he feared that swift western migration would
threaten “the vigor of the Nation by scattering too widely and too sparsely the
elements of resource and strength.”99 Jefferson and his Secretary of Treasury,
Albert Gallatin, similarly worried that large-scale sale would undermine inter-
connectedness with the East, cause conflict with Native Americans, and result
in a nation too large for republican government.100 Federalists and Jeffersonians
thus used federal land policy as a tool to extract revenue for the good of the
nation and control the flow of western settlement in the territories.
98. The federal government controlled military installations, post offices, and the capital under
its other enumerated powers.
99. VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 53 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, DEFENSE OF THE R
FUNDING SYSTEM (1796), reprinted in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 39–40
(Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1973)).
100. Id. at 69–73.
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After Congress passed legislation enabling the admission of seven states
from 1802 to 1821, it continued to sell land within the new states on the same
terms that applied to land within the territories.101 Each of Congress’s enabling
acts contained three essential features. First, as the Northwest Ordinance had
promised, they specified that the new states would be admitted on “the same
footing with the original States in all respects whatever.”102 Second, as a condi-
tion of admission, the new states disclaimed any right to the public domain
within their borders.103 Third, the new states were granted a limited amount of
land and revenue for internal improvements in exchange for an exemption for
all federal lands from state taxation for five years following sale.104 Throughout
the administrations of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison, the fed-
eral government not only assumed the power to own land within the states, but
also purposely limited land sales to control the rate and location of settlements.
In this early period, few argued that the federal government lacked the power to
limit land sales or that federal land retention violated state sovereignty.105
B. Distribution, Graduation, and Cession
The economic collapse caused by the Panic of 1819, however, triggered
calls for major change. Many blamed the financial meltdown on a federal land
policy that encouraged excessive speculation in western lands.106 Because they
blamed Congress for the economic crisis, many Westerners resented federal
interference and demanded more local control combined with reduced land
prices. Easterners, however, sought to extract more money from land sales or a
distribution of land to the state governments to compensate for declining
revenues.107
The early debates over the distribution of land illustrate the principle that
Congress had a duty to use the lands for the common benefit. Maryland ad-
101. GATES, supra note 12, at 288–95 (discussing the admission of Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, R
Illinois, Mississippi, Alabama, and Missouri).
102. Id.
103. Id. For example, Ohio’s enabling act provides that the state’s government and constitution
could not violate the Northwest Ordinance, which, as explained above, specifies that the new
states have no right to interfere with Congress’s ownership or disposal of the public lands. Id.
104. More specifically, the new states were given a portion of all federal lands sold within their
borders for the creation of schools; varying amounts of land near springs; and five percent of
the net profits from land sales for internal improvements. Id.
105. Although they did not become a major national issue, constitutional arguments against fed-
eral land ownership within Tennessee date back to the state’s 1796 constitutional conven-
tion. See Ablavsky, supra note 12, at 138–41. R
106. See VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 86. This speculation was blamed on Congress’s sale of land R
on credit. Congress thus ended sales on credit in April 1820 and reduced the minimum price
to $1.25 per acre. Id. at 87, 93.
107. See GATES, supra note 12, at 7–9. R
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vanced the earliest proposal for the distribution of land to the states in a report
submitted to Congress in 1821. Maryland began by arguing that the nearly
two-decade-old policy of giving public lands to the new states for education
violated the common benefit principle.108 The public lands, Maryland asserted,
had been obtained “by the common sword, purse, and blood of all the States,
united in a common effort.”109 Any use of the land for the “benefit of any partic-
ular State or States, to the exclusion of the others,” therefore, would be “a viola-
tion of the spirit of our national compact.”110 To remedy the violation,
Maryland requested a share of the federal lands in the western states and terri-
tories that was similar to that given to the new states.111 Maryland’s request no
doubt arose from the Panic of 1819, which had undermined the state’s plans to
allocate funds for education.112 Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
New Jersey, Kentucky, Delaware, and Vermont quickly issued similar
demands.113
Maryland’s report was referred to the Senate Committee on Public Lands,
and Chairman Jesse Thomas of Illinois issued a report rejecting distribution
and defending the constitutionality of the nation’s public land policy. Educa-
tional land grants to the new states, Thomas argued, were constitutional be-
cause they inured to the common benefit through the “increased value which
the population and improvement of the State gave to the unsold public
lands.”114
Ninian Edwards, Illinois’ other senator, further argued that giving public
land to the states under the Maryland plan would be unconstitutional. Edwards
agreed with Maryland that, under the Property Clause, “the property of the
108. See 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1772–84 (1821). Andrew Gregg, Representative from Penn-
sylvania, also made a similar argument during debate over the admission of Ohio. See 12
ANNALS OF CONG. 584–86 (1803).
109. 37 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 108, at 1774. R
110. Id. at 1776. Maryland also rejected the idea that the new states were entitled to lands within
their borders. The report states:
The public lands are not the less the common property of all the States because
they are situated within the jurisdictional limits of the States and Territories which
have been formed out of them . . . . The interest which a citizen of an Atlantic
State has in them, as part of the property of the Union, is the same as the interest
of a citizen residing in a State formed out of them.
Id. at 1781.
111. Id. at 1781.
112. See FELLER, supra note 12, at 40, 47. R
113. GATES, supra note 12, at 7. R
114. 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 439–40 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds.,
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834). Treasury Albert Gallatin made the same argument
when proposing the policy nearly twenty years earlier. GATES, supra note 12, at 289. R
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Union should be disposed of for the use and benefit of the Union.”115 Mary-
land’s proposal to give public land to the states, however, would violate this
principle because “no State can rightfully claim . . . the separate and distinct
use, and enjoyment of, the property, or funds of the nation.”116 Giving land to
the old states, he further argued, “would be transferring to those States a power
exclusively delegated to Congress.”117 Edwards explained: “It cannot be con-
tended that we are competent to delegate powers for such purposes to the
States, for, if that be the case, there are no powers with which we are invested,
that might not, with equal propriety, be transferred.”118 Congress was given
responsibility over the public domain, he asserted, because a uniform national
policy was needed to ensure orderly settlement.119 After Edwards’ speech, Con-
gress abandoned the Maryland proposal.120
Although Westerners opposed giving lands to the old states to promote
education, many supported distributing a portion of the revenue from land sales
to the states, so long as all states benefited.121 In the debate over Maryland’s
proposal, for example, Thomas’s senate report and a report from the Ohio leg-
islature favored a distribution of revenue.122 Three years later, Senator Johnson
of Louisiana introduced a resolution stating that the public lands should be
“pledged as a permanent and perpetual fund” for state education and internal
improvements through the distribution of land sale revenue.123 House and Sen-
ate committee reports favoring distribution were again introduced in 1826 and
1829.124 While some sought to distribute land-sale revenue to the states,
Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri introduced several bills to gradually reduce
the price of unsold land the longer it remained on the market.125 Millions of
acres of federal land had already been surveyed and put on the market, but there
was not sufficient demand to buy at the minimum federal price of $1.25 per
acre. Benton argued that “graduation,” as his plan became known, would facili-
115. 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 251 (1822).
116. Id. at 249. Like Thomas, Edwards argued that giving new states land for educational pur-
poses did serve a national object, because it increased land prices and promoted republican
government in the West. See id. at 259–60.
117. Id. at 253.
118. Id. at 250.
119. Id. at 253–54. Giving the old states extensive territory within the new states, Edwards as-
serted, would lead to competition in land prices between the states and federal government.
Moreover, he worried it would effectively subject the new states to the interests of the old.
Id.
120. FELLER, supra note 12, at 47. Although most of the northeast supported it, New York, R
Massachusetts, and Virginia opposed it. Id. at 42–43.
121. Id. at 47.
122. Id.; 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 114, at 439–40. R
123. 1 REG. DEB. 42 (1824).
124. GATES, supra note 12, at 8. R
125. See 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 582 (1824); 3 REG. DEB. 39 (1827).
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tate the sale of less productive land, encourage compact settlement, and pro-
mote egalitarian republicanism by allowing those of lesser means to become
freeholders.126 For similar reasons, Benton also supported preemption legisla-
tion to give squatters valid legal claims to their lands.127 Benton’s proposals
gained support from many who felt that the traditional system slowed western
development and let the public land go to waste.128
When originally proposed in 1824, however, Benton’s plan gained little
support outside of the western public land states.129 The Atlantic states had no
desire to add further enticements for westward migration. If settlement oc-
curred too quickly, Easterners feared, land prices would plummet and labor
shortages would harm Eastern manufacturing.130 Slow, steady, and deliberate
settlement in the West was more consistent with Eastern interests. Even Wes-
terners were divided. Senator David Barton, Benton’s political rival in Missouri
and the Chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, called graduation “ficti-
tious and delusive” because, rather than facilitate sales to poor farmers, it would
merely enable rich land speculators to buy up the public domain.131
The debate over graduation further demonstrates that Congress was un-
derstood to have had complete power over federal land policy. Benton recog-
nized that federal land policy effectively prevented private ownership and
development. Instead of arguing that Congress had a constitutional duty to
adopt a less restrictive land policy—whether based on a duty to sell or the sov-
ereignty of the new states—Benton’s arguments sounded in policy. A majority
in Congress thought it wiser that the lands be retained indefinitely in federal
control.
Frustrated by high land prices and Congress’s rejection of preemption and
graduation, prominent Westerners demanded that Congress cede title to all
federal land within the new states. Although the ensuing debates covered far
more ground, they focused on the issue of whether federal landownership was
consistent with the equal sovereignty of the new states.
Ninian Edwards, the Governor of Illinois and a former U.S. senator, de-
livered the most comprehensive equal sovereignty argument in two addresses to
126. VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 106–07. In support of his second graduation bill, Benton R
dramatically declared: “I speak to . . . an assembly of legislators, and not to a keeper of the
King’s forests. I speak to Senators who know this to be a Republic, not a Monarchy; who
know that the public lands belong to the People, and not to the Federal Government.” 2
REG. DEB. 727 (1826).
127. VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 107–08. R
128. Id. at 109–10.
129. See FELLER, supra note 12, at 81. R
130. Id.
131. 3 REG. DEB. 40–42 (1827). The 1824 graduation bill was thus tabled. Benton introduced a
graduation bill again in 1828, but it was defeated by a narrow margin in the Senate. See
FELLER, supra note 12, at 94–96. R
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the Illinois legislature in 1828 and 1830.132 Congress’s policy of slow and delib-
erate land sales within existing states, Edwards argued, was unjust and uncon-
stitutional. Prior to statehood, he asserted, “there was no other State to object
whose welfare could be checked, or whose sovereignty, freedom, independence
or jurisdiction could be violated.”133 The new states, however, were admitted to
the Union on “an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever.”134 A new state, he asserted, would not “be on an equal footing with
the original States in a very important respect, if the United States could hold
more lands, or hold them for different purposes, within its limits” with respect
to the other states.135 Because the original states had no public lands, Congress
could assert jurisdiction over land within them only pursuant to the Enclave
Clause, which requires state consent and authorizes federal landholding only
for limited purposes.136 Allowing Congress to control most of the territory
within a new state under the Property Clause, he asserted, would therefore
place the public land states on “vastly different and unequal . . . footing.”137 “It
would . . . be a singular anomaly,” he explained, if the Enclave Clause would
prohibit Congress from buying a small plot of land for the common defense
within an original state, when the Property Clause would allow Congress to
“hold millions and millions of acres within the [new] State, for almost every
other conceivable purpose.”138
The equal sovereignty of the new states, Edwards continued, required
Congress to cede title of all federal lands within a state. “The sovereignty of a
State,” he asserted, “includes the right to exercise supreme and exclusive control
over all lands within it. . . . The right of any State or Nation to the public lands
that lie within it, is not only a right of independence, but is inseparable from
it.”139 Because “every sovereignty, properly so called, is in its nature one and
indivisible,” state sovereignty over the public lands dictated a lack of federal
132. See NINIAN W. EDWARDS, HISTORY OF ILLINOIS, FROM 1778 TO 1833; AND LIFE AND
TIMES OF NINIAN EDWARDS 112–13 (Ill. St. J. Co. 1870) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ILLI-
NOIS]; NINIAN EDWARDS, AN ADDRESS, DELIVERED BY NINIAN EDWARDS, GOVERNOR
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, TO BOTH HOUSES OF THE LEGISLATURE, DECEMBER 7,
1830, at 12 (Illinois, Vandalia 1830) [hereinafter AN ADDRESS]. Edwards, however, was not
the first to make this argument. In response to the 1821 Maryland proposal discussed above,
for example, the Ohio legislature declared in a report that “the new states have an indisputa-
ble claim, to all the unappropriated lands, within their respective limits” because land owner-
ship was an “appendage of their sovereign characters.” FELLER, supra note 12, at 43 (quoting R
S. JOURNAL, 20th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. 180–81 (Ohio 1821)).
133. HISTORY OF ILLINOIS, supra note 132, at 110–11. R
134. Id. at 114.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 115.
137. Id. at 114–15.
138. Id. at 116.
139. Id. at 118–19.
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sovereignty.140 In other words, “as the right of the one necessarily excludes that
of the other, it cannot belong to both at the same time.”141 Congress’s power
under the Property Clause, he therefore argued, applied only to land outside the
borders of a state.142
The public benefit principle, he further argued, was no obstacle to his
proposal to transfer the public lands to the states. Such a transfer, he asserted,
would inure to the common benefit of the nation by encouraging the develop-
ment of national commerce and power.143 Moreover, the common benefit prin-
ciple was a “mere question of dollars and cents,” whereas the equality of the
states “involves the most important natural and political rights of millions of
freemen, and the peace and harmony of the whole Union.”144
Edwards finally contended that the provisions of the Northwest Ordi-
nance and state enabling acts that purported to reserve the public domain for
Congress even after statehood were null and void. The federal government is
limited to its enumerated powers and “can make no bargain with a State in the
Union for a part of its sovereign rights.”145 If a state could give its sovereignty to
the federal government, he explained, the Constitution’s carefully balanced fed-
eral system could easily be destroyed. “All bargains, therefore, with the people
of a Territory . . . restrictive of the equal rights of a sovereign and independent
member of the Union, are, after admission, not only voidable, like civil con-
tracts made during infancy, but absolutely null and void as being incompatible
with and repugnant to the fundamental law.”146 Edwards ended his address by
calling on the Illinois legislature to ask Congress to transfer the public lands to
state control.147
On January 28, 1828, Senator William Hendricks of Indiana introduced
an amendment to a federal land bill to cede all public lands within existing
states.148 Like Edwards, he asserted that “the equality and sovereignty of the
new States require that these States should have the control of the public lands
within their limits.”149 After reviewing the history of the cession of the public
lands to Congress, Hendricks stated that the condition that the lands be used
140. Id. at 119 (quoting Emer de Vattel).
141. Id. at 120; see also AN ADDRESS, supra note 132, at 9 (“[W]e are threatened with the estab- R
lishment of a complete imperium in imperio within the limits of our own state . . . .”).
142. HISTORY OF ILLINOIS, supra note 132, at 120; AN ADDRESS, supra note 132, at 11. R
143. HISTORY OF ILLINOIS, supra note 132, at 118. R
144. Id. at 117.
145. Id. at 113.
146. Id.; see also AN ADDRESS, supra note 132, at 27. R
147. HISTORY OF ILLINOIS, supra note 132, at 123. R
148. 4 REG. DEB. 151 (1828).
149. Id. at 152. Hendricks further stated that, under the prevailing system, “the equality, sover-
eignty, and independence, of the new States, are lost in their abject and humiliating depen-
dence on the Federal Government.” Id. at 151. He made a similar argument in debate over
the Missouri Crisis of 1820. See FELLER, supra note 12, at 37. R
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for the common benefit “was not intended by either party to be a permanent
one,” because “it is stipulated that new States shall be formed out of this terri-
tory.”150 He further asserted: “We shall search in vain for any clause in the
Constitution, which authorizes a control over the principle object of sovereignty
in the States—their public lands.”151 The Property Clause provided no basis, he
asserted, because the word “Territory, in our Constitution, our laws, and our
history, signifies a region of country without the limits of a State.”152 Senator
John McKinley of Alabama made similar points in a speech in favor of Hen-
dricks’s amendment.153 When cession received no Atlantic support, however,
Hendricks’s amendment was tabled.154
Nevertheless, within the next year, the legislatures of Illinois, Indiana, and
Louisiana all petitioned Congress to cede the federally owned lands within their
borders to state control.155 The Indiana petition, for example, asserted that the
state “has the exclusive right to the soil and eminent domain of all the unappro-
priated lands within her acknowledged boundaries.”156 It called on Indiana’s
federal representatives “to use every exertion in their power, by reason and argu-
ment, to induce the United States to acknowledge this vested right of the
States, and place her upon an equal footing with the original States.”157
The East, however, was united in rejecting cession. Historian Daniel
Feller concludes that “the Eastern press . . . ridiculed the Western preten-
sions. . . . Northerners and Southerners, Adams and Jackson men, all spurned
the Western claims.”158 In addition to the obvious economic incentives to op-
pose cession,159 Easterners rejected the Western argument based on equal sover-
eignty and developed their own constitutional arguments against cession.
150. 4 REG. DEB. 155 (1828). Following Edwards, Hendricks also argued that any condition on
the admission of a new state that it must give up its claims to its territory was null and void
upon statehood, because a state could not surrender its sovereignty to Congress. Id. at
159–62.
151. Id. at 161.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 507–21 (1828) (“I shall endeavor to show that the United States have no constitu-
tional right or claim to the lands in the new States.”).
154. FELLER, supra note 12, at 94–95. R
155. 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 622, 624, 630 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney
eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860) [hereinafter 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS].
156. Id. at 630.
157. Id.
158. FELLER, supra note 12, at 109. R
159. Although many worried that rapid emigration could create labor shortages in northeastern
manufacturing, most Northeasterners understood that slow and deliberate western develop-
ment would create a home market for Eastern goods. A carefully planned land policy,
Northeasterners further believed, was needed to help ensure that Western settlers would
have the education, order, and virtue needed for republican society. Strict federal control
over western development, they thus believed, was more consistent with eastern interests
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In sum, leading statesmen from each region and party responded to West-
ern demands for cession with the three principles listed above. Since the time of
the Founding, it had always been understood that Congress had complete dis-
cretion over federal land policy. Ceding federal land to the states, they further
argued, would favor the new states and thus violate the common benefit princi-
ple. Continued federal ownership, they finally contended, was fully consistent
with equal state sovereignty.
On February 25, 1829, for example, Representative James Stevenson of
Pennsylvania authored a scathing report on the state cession petitions for a
special committee of the House. Stevenson noted that “several of the new
States have now boldly demanded of Congress the surrender of the lands within
their limits, although the sovereignty and right of soil were obtained by the
treasure, or won from the Indians by the blood of the citizens of the old
States.”160 He continued:
These demands, the committee are disposed to believe, have been
rather the acts of certain individuals than the deliberate expression of
the people at large. The patriotism of the citizens of the old States,
who voluntary conceded these lands to the Union, might here be
placed by the committee in strong contrast with the want of that
feeling in the citizens of the new States who could seriously demand
from the Union the surrender of all this invaluable property to them
alone. But if any States have, in reality, an unhallowed desire to get, it
may be useful to them to reflect that the other States have the power
to keep, and that it is the duty of the representatives of these to know
that if the national property is parted with, it is parted with only for
the general advantage.161
Stevenson and the special committee therefore not only rejected a state’s right
to the public lands within its borders, but also asserted that ceding the land to
the states would violate Congress’s duty to dispose of the land for the common
benefit.
President Adams also spoke against cession during his annual message in
1827. Adams asserted that federal land policy had been “eminently successful”
and stressed that the public lands were “the common property of the Union, the
appropriation and disposal of which are sacred trusts in the hands of Con-
gress.”162 According to historian Daniel Feller, “[a] few years before, Adams’s
remarks would have been considered innocuous truisms, the like of which ap-
than indiscriminately turning the land over to the states or private parties. See VAN ATTA,
supra note 12, at 146–50. R
160. 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 155, at 796. R
161. Id.
162. FELLER, supra note 12, at 92 (quoting 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS R
OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1902, at 391 (James D. Richardson ed., 1907)).
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peared regularly in the messages of Presidents Madison and Monroe.”163 Fol-
lowing on the heels of Western demands for cession, however, they carried a
deeper meaning.
An article edited by Representative Edward Everett of Massachusetts and
published in the North American Review asserted that Ninian Edwards’s argu-
ment for cession “has found no great favor as yet in Congress.”164 Everett also
quoted Representative William Archer of Virginia as asserting that demands
for cession created “a relation of war, between the States.”165 Any attack on
public land policy, Everett further claimed, would impugn the “leading states-
men” of the republic, with “General Washington and Mr. Jefferson [being] the
most distinguished.”166
Many Westerners even rejected cession as too radical.167 Senator James
Noble of Indiana, for example, argued that federal ownership of land within a
state did not undermine the equality of the new states because “the soil and
taxation are separable from the sovereignty” of a state.168 He further cited Vir-
ginia’s act of cession, the Northwest Ordinance, the Property Clause, and Indi-
ana’s enabling act as evidence that, while the federal government owned the
public lands and had an obligation to use them for the common benefit, the
new states were sovereign and equal to the old.169
Senator Barton of Missouri, moreover, called cession a “suicidal act” that
would “destroy the Union.”170 He derided the equal sovereignty argument as
follows:
Their argument stands thus: Until the Federal lands are disposed of
in the new countries, State sovereignty cannot exist there, according
to the Constitution. The Federal lands were not disposed of in the
new States when they were admitted, and, therefore, they are not
sovereign States of the Union. And thus, Sir, by a discovery made at
163. Id.
164. Speeches made in the Senate of the United States, on Occasion of the Resolution offered by Mr.
Foot, on the Subject of the Public Lands, during the First Session of the Twenty-first Congress, 31
N. AMER. REV. 467 (Edward Everett ed., 1830) [hereinafter Speeches].
165. Id. at 467–68.
166. Id. at 470.
167. FELLER, supra note 12, at 108. Illinois Representative Joseph Duncan, for example, warned R
that unrealistic demands for cession undermined more realistic Western requests for internal
improvements and limited grants of lands for specific purposes. See id. at 134–35. Davy
Crockett, the “King of the Western Frontier,” also distanced himself from cession during a
debate over federal land in Tennessee. See 6 REG. DEB. 480, 873 (1829–1830).
168. See 4 REG. DEB. 580 (1828).
169. Id. at 580–81.
170. See 3 REG. DEB. 43 (1827).
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this late day, after a quiet practice of thirty years, are we to be syllo-
gized out of the Union!171
Barton also rejected the equal sovereignty argument on its merits. “[T]he
answer to these new notions is,” he explained, “there is no such thing as abso-
lute State sovereignty over all subjects.”172 While Ninian Edwards had argued
that sovereignty was indivisible, Barton contended that the Constitution di-
vided power over the public lands between the state and national governments.
Under the Constitution, Congress had the power to own and sell the public
lands, whereas the state retained the power to otherwise regulate them. He thus
asserted that “[t]he new States do possess all the potential sovereignty of the old
States, though they may not yet possess all the subjects upon which to exercise
their powers.”173 According to Barton, Congress’s power over the public lands
was therefore fully consistent with state equality.
Southerners rejected cession of the public lands as well. House Represen-
tative William Martin of South Carolina called cession “preposterous.”174 Lead-
ing newspapers such as the The Richmond Enquirer and The Southern Recorder
also opposed cession despite their strong commitments to states’ rights.175 John
C. Calhoun warned that cession “would at once unsettle the whole landed
property of the U.S.,” as states competed with each other for settlers by reduc-
ing land prices.176
James Madison also rejected the constitutional argument for cession in
private correspondence in 1831.177 He asserted that “the title in the people of
the United States rests on a foundation too just and solid to be shaken by any
technical or metaphysical arguments whatever.”178 He continued:
The known and acknowledged intentions of the parties at the time,
with a prescriptive sanction of so many years consecrated by the in-
trinsic principles of equity, would overrule even the most explicit dec-
larations and terms, as has been done without the aid of that principle
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. He further explained: “If infractions of State laws happen upon public lands within her
limits, they are cognizable by State authority; and Missouri possesses all the kinds of power
or sovereignty that New York does, although she has no grand canal upon which to exercise
her powers.” Id.
174. FELLER, supra note 12, at 126 (quoting Rep. William Martin, Address at a Public Dinner in R
Barnwell, S.C. (June 30, 1830), in 38 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 445, 453 (1830)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 149 (quoting Memorandum from Col. James H. Hammond (Mar. 18, 1831), in 6 AM.
HIST. REV. 741, 743 (1901)).
177. JAMES MADISON, 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 187 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
178. Id. at 188.
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in the slaves, who remain such in spite of the declarations that all
men are born equally free.179
In other words, Madison asserted that the framers’ intent for Congress to retain
title to the public domain was so clear that no legalistic argument could defeat
it, much as slavery existed notwithstanding the principle of equality. Madison
thus predicted that, when cession was taken up in Congress, it “can and will be
demolished.”180
Writing for the Committee on Manufactures in 1832, Henry Clay, the
influential senator from Kentucky, condemned both graduation and cession.181
Clay argued that Congress was “solemnly bound to hold and administer the
lands ceded, as a common fund for the use and benefit of all the States, and for
no other use or purpose whatever.”182 He thus asserted that “[t]he general gov-
ernment has no . . . power, rightfully, to cede the lands thus acquired to one of
the new States, without a fair equivalent.”183 Because the Louisiana Purchase
has been paid from the common treasury, “to squander or improvidently cast
[the public lands] away, would be alike subversive to the interests of the people
of the United States and contrary to the plain dictates of the duty by which the
general government stands bound to the States and the whole people.”184
Not only did Congress have an obligation to use the public lands for the
common benefit, Clay asserted, but transferring them to the states would pro-
duce disastrous results. He explained: “Competition would probably arise be-
tween the new States in the terms which they would offer to purchasers.”185 As
a result, “[c]ollisions between the States would probably arise,” and a “spirit of
hazardous speculation would be engendered.”186 Any sale of the lands to the
new states, moreover, would undermine the Union by creating “between the
debtor States a common feeling and a common interest, distinct from the rest
of the Union.”187 Collecting the debt from the states, moreover, would raise a
host of difficulties.188
179. Id.
180. Id. at 187.
181. 6 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 441–47 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds.,
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860) [hereinafter 6 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS]. The com-
mittee had been tasked with inquiring into “the expediency of reducing the price of public
lands, and of ceding them to the several States within which they are situated.” Id.
182. Id. at 442.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 446.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 447 (“Delinquency on the part of the debtor States would be inevitable, and there
would be no effectual remedy for delinquency.”).
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Clay also opposed cession because it was inconsistent with the American
System, which was a plan to integrate the Union through a system of economic
policies.189 In the West, Clay sought to generate federal revenue through land
sales and develop reciprocal commercial relationships between the agriculture of
the West and the manufacturing of the East through internal improvements.
Clay feared, however, that a drastic reduction in the price of public land would
not only decrease federal revenue from land sales, but would also attract unpro-
ductive poor settlers to the West and undermine eastern land values.190 National
control over land policy, moreover, could best facilitate the development of in-
ternal improvements such as roads and canals that would facilitate commerce
between the sections.191 The Whig Party’s American System therefore de-
pended on federal control of the land and strict limitations on its sale.192
C. Cession and Nullification
Many Southerners, however, believed that Clay’s American System “was a
monstrous Northern plot to plunder Southern wealth.”193 The tariff, they con-
tended, not only subsidized Northern manufacturing, but it also taxed the
Southern economy due to its reliance on cash crops and international trade.
Tariff revenue, in turn, was funneled into internal improvements that primarily
benefitted the North and the Northwest and thus further consolidated national
power. A strong national government unmoored from constitutional restraints
posed an existential threat to the South and its slave-based society.194
Southern opposition to the tariff culminated in South Carolina’s nullifica-
tion crisis of 1828–1832. John C. Calhoun’s Exposition and Protest, which was
adopted by the state legislature, argued that the tariff was unconstitutional be-
cause it did not treat the states equally.195 Calhoun asserted that the powers of
189. See VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 113–14. The most important components of the American R
System were a protective tariff, national bank, and internal improvements. Id.
190. See id. at 127–29. Clay asserted that federal land policy “lays the foundation of useful civil
institutions” by establishing clear property rights and promoting compact settlement by set-
tlers of moderate means. 6 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 181, at 443. R
191. See VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 130. R
192. Clay thus personally scorned the idea of ceding the land to the states. In private correspon-
dence, Clay stated: “In Illinois there are about forty millions of acres of public land, and
about one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty thousand people. What think you of
giving that large amount of land to that comparatively small number of people?” Letter from
Henry Clay to Francis Brooke (Mar. 28, 1832), in 4 CALVIN COLTON, THE LIFE, CORRE-
SPONDENCE, AND SPEECHES OF HENRY CLAY 331 (New York, A.S. Barnes & Co. 1857).
193. FELLER, supra note 12, at 89. R
194. See, e.g., id. at 74, 89; 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 696–97 (1825) (statement of Sen. Robert
Hayne of South Carolina).
195. See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY 257
(1990).
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the “general government are intended to act uniformly on all the parts.”196 The
tariff, however, created “inequality and oppression” because it imposed severe
economic burdens on the South that were then used to subsidize manufacturing
in the North.197 South Carolina’s constitutional argument against the tariff
therefore relied on a state equality argument not unlike that used by advocates
of cession.198
South Carolina’s chosen remedy of nullification was also equally applicable
to constitutional demands for cession.199 Edwards and Hendricks both invoked
nullification during their arguments for cession.200 In a conversation with Presi-
dent Adams, Clay “spoke of a long message from Ninian Edwards,” and ex-
pressed concern over “the threats of disunion from the South, and the graspings
after all the public lands, which are disclosing themselves in the Western
States.”201 The Niles Weekly Register warned that “the stand taken by South
Carolina against the tariff, may be taken by Illinois concerning the public
lands.”202
In this explosive political context—where Southerners demanded reduc-
tions in the tariff, Westerners demanded federal lands, and both sections
threatened nullification—Senator Samuel A. Foot of Connecticut provoked
one of the most famous debates in the history of the Senate.203 The “Great
196. Exposition and Protest: Reported by the Special Committee of the House of Representatives of
South Carolina on the Tariff (Dec. 19, 1828), in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 263 (Thomas Cooper ed., Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1836).
197. Id. at 249.
198. In fact, after Edwards’ address to the Illinois legislature, Edward “Duff” Green, one of Cal-
houn’s men, wrote to Edwards: “Your views on the rights of the States are considered able
and conclusive. . . . Your position in relation to the public lands brings you into company
with the South and West and in direct conflict with the East.” Letter from Edward “Duff”
Green to Ninian Edwards (Jan. 6, 1829), in 3 THE EDWARDS PAPERS: BEING A PORTION
OF THE COLLECTION OF THE LETTERS, PAPERS, AND MANUSCRIPTS OF NINIAN ED-
WARDS 380 (E.B. Washburne ed., Chicago, Fergus Printing Co. 1884) (emphasis in
original).
199. See FELLER, supra note 12, at 118 (“Nullification was a practical remedy as well as a theoreti- R
cal doctrine, and one that in 1830 appeared as likely to be tried in the West as in the
South.”).
200. Edwards argued that “it should not be forgotten that a State has an equal right with the
United States to judge of all such matters.” HISTORY OF ILLINOIS, supra note 132, at 112. R
Hendricks also warned that federal ownership of the public lands “offer[s] to the new States
the strongest inducement to a severance of the Union.” 4 REG. DEB. 165 (1828). He asked:
“Suppose the Union to be dissolved, and where would be the public lands?” Id.
201. 8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 87–88 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876). Adams expressed similar concerns. See FELLER, supra note 12, R
at 116–17.
202. South Carolina and Nullification, NILES’ WKLY. REG., Nov. 10, 1832, at 167.
203. For more on the “Great Debate” generally, see HERMAN BELZ, THE WEBSTER-HAYNE
DEBATE ON THE NATURE OF THE UNION (2012); STEFAN M. BROOKS, THE WEBSTER-
HAYNE DEBATE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF UNION (2009).
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Debate” would last more than three months and give voice to the great sec-
tional issues of the day. Thomas Hart Benton would speak for the West, Rob-
ert Y. Hayne of South Carolina for the South, and Daniel Webster of
Massachusetts for the Northeast. Although the debate has been immortalized
because of the famous exchange between Hayne and Webster over the nature of
the Union, Congress’s power over the public domain was also a leading subject.
Foot triggered the debate with a proposal to temporarily halt the surveying
of new land.204 He justified his proposal by arguing that the market for federal
land had excess supply. Seventy-two million acres of public land had been sur-
veyed and offered for sale, he explained, but only about one million acres were
sold each year.205 Because the public “lands are the common property of the
United States,” he asserted, sales should be in the “public interest” rather than
in the interests of only purchasers in the new states.206
Benton immediately rose in opposition. He argued that the resolution
would “inflict unmixed, unmitigated evil upon the new States and Territo-
ries.”207 The seventy-two million unsold acres, he asserted, were “scraps” or “re-
fuse” land unsuitable to productive settlers.208 If no new lands were put on the
market, he continued, emigration to the western states would end, as would
their economic, cultural, and political development.209 A federal land policy that
restrained settlement and left productive land undeveloped, he further argued,
violated the “Divine command” and was an “injury to the whole human race.”210
He ominously warned: “it is time for the new States to wake up to their danger,
and to prepare for a struggle which carries ruin and disgrace to them, if the
issue is against them.”211 Given the larger context of the looming nullification
crisis in the South and demands for cession of the public lands coming from
several western states, Benton’s words carried threatening implications.212
Benton further charged that Foot’s resolution was a sectional measure de-
signed by the East to aid manufacturing at the expense of the West and the
South. Ending western emigration, he asserted, would “confine the poor people
of the Northeast to work as journeymen in the manufactories,” thus keeping
labor prices low.213 Low revenue from the sale of federal lands, he further as-
serted, would justify a high protective tariff.214 As South Carolina forcefully
204. 6 REG. DEB. 3–4 (1829).
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id.
207. 6 REG. DEB. 23 (1830).
208. 6 REG. DEB. 4 (1829).
209. Id. at 4–5.
210. 6 REG. DEB. 22, 24 (1830).
211. Id. at 23.
212. VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 156. R
213. 6 REG. DEB. 24 (1830).
214. Id.
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argued in the Exposition and Protest, tariffs not only benefitted Northern manu-
facturers, but they also disproportionately affected the South, because planta-
tions typically produced cash crops for export.215 The Northeast’s plan, Benton
asserted, was “[a] most complex scheme of injustice, which taxes the South to
injure the West, to pauperize the poor of the North!”216 Benton seemed to
implicitly call for Southern assistance on public land policy in exchange for
Western opposition to the tariff.217
Hayne took Benton’s invitation to attack Foot’s resolution on behalf of the
South. “The people of America are,” he asserted, “and ought to be for a century
to come, essentially an agricultural people.”218 Public land policy, he stated, thus
should “convert into great and flourishing communities, that entire class of per-
sons, who would otherwise be paupers in your streets, and outcasts in soci-
ety.”219 Hayne further stated: “From the bottom of my soul do I abhor and
detest the idea, that the powers of the Federal Government should ever be
prostituted” to slow western migration for the benefit of Eastern manufactur-
ing.220 Following Benton’s lead, Hayne thus argued that the federal government
should pursue a policy designed to sell land at low prices to anyone willing to
farm it.
Hayne, however, rejected the constitutional argument for cession.221 “This
claim,” he asserted, “was set up for the first time only a few years ago.”222 He
called the argument “untenable” because the federal government had “absolute
property” in the public lands.223 Federal land ownership, Hayne acknowledged,
could be “inconvenient” to the new states and hinder their development. “But
though this state of things may present strong claims on the Federal Govern-
ment for the adoption of a liberal policy towards the new States, it cannot affect
the question of legal or constitutional right.”224 In fact, Hayne thought the consti-
tutional argument for cession was so extreme that it would “never be recognized
by the Federal Government” and thus had “no other effect than to create a
prejudice against the claims of the new states.”225
215. See Exposition and Protest, supra note 196, at 249–50. R
216. 6 REG. DEB. 24 (1830).
217. VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 154. Former President John Quincy Adams worried that “Ben- R
ton . . . proposed to break down the union of the Eastern and Western sections, . . . restoring
the old joint operation of the West and the South against New England.” 8 MEMOIRS OF
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 201, at 190. R
218. 6 REG. DEB. 34 (1830).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (rejecting the argument that the new states “have a full and perfect legal and constitu-
tional right to all the lands within their respective limits”).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. Id.
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Hayne also famously defended state sovereignty and South Carolina’s right
to nullify federal law. “The true nature of the Federal constitution,” Hayne
asserted, is a “compact by which each State, acting in its sovereign capacity, has
entered into an agreement with the other States, by which they have consented
that certain designated powers shall be exercised by the United States.”226 Be-
cause the states “have not surrendered their sovereignty,” Hayne asserted, the
states retained the power to judge when the federal government exceeded the
scope of its delegated powers.227 This right was shared equally by the states, he
asserted, because “all sovereigns are of necessity equal.”228 Hayne thus saw no
inconsistency with a broad interpretation of Congress’s Power to Dispose and
equal state sovereignty.
In his first reply to Hayne, Daniel Webster argued that federal land policy
was designed to benefit the West rather than to restrain it.229 The object of
federal policy, he contended, had always been to “hasten its settlement and
cultivation, as far and as fast as practicable; and to rear the new communities
into equal and independent States.”230 He warned, however, that introducing
too much land to the market at once would attract few additional settlers, result
in “speculation by individuals, on a large scale,” undermine the price of lands
that had already been sold, and discourage investments in improvements.231
Rather than seeking to check western development, Webster argued, the
Northeast worked to ensure its steady and deliberate settlement.
As a matter of constitutional law, Webster argued that the only restriction
on Congress’s power to dispose of the public lands was the requirement that
they be used for the common benefit. He explained that, “at the moment of the
cession of the lands [from the states to the federal government], and by the very
terms of that cession, every State in the Union obtained an interest in them, as
a common fund. Congress has uniformly adhered to this condition.”232 He con-
tinued: “The Government has always felt itself bound, in regard to sale and
settlement, to exercise its own best judgment, and not to transfer the discretion
to others.”233 Because the public lands were “a public fund,” he argued that
Congress was “no more authorized to give them away gratuitously than to give
226. Id. at 86.
227. Id. For Hayne, because the Supreme Court “is created by, and is indeed merely one of the
departments of, the Federal Government,” it had no more right to rule on the allocation of
power between states and federal government than the supreme courts of each state. Id. at
88.
228. Id. at 86.
229. See id. at 36 (“No, Sir, I deny altogether, that there has been anything harsh or severe in the
policy of the Government towards the new States of the West.”); id. at 64 (“So, then, sir,
New England is guiltless of the policy of retarding Western population.”).
230. Id. at 36.
231. Id. at 35.
232. Id. at 37.
233. Id.
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away gratuitously the money in the treasury.”234 Any transfer to the states would
thus be unconstitutional.
In Webster’s second reply to Hayne, he famously articulated the national-
ist view of the Union already endorsed by the Supreme Court in cases such as
McCulloch v. Maryland235 and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.236 Rather than a com-
pact among the states, Webster argued that the Constitution was “made for the
people; made by the people; and answerable to the people.”237 Thus, he ex-
plained, “[t]he General Government and the State Governments derive their
authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called
primary, though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residu-
ary.”238 The people had therefore divided sovereignty between the two levels of
government and made the Supreme Court the arbiter of that division.239
Webster’s theory of divided sovereignty was inconsistent with both nullifi-
cation and Ninian Edwards’s constitutional argument for cession. Edwards’s
argument assumed that sovereignty was indivisible. Federal sovereignty over the
public lands, Edwards argued, necessarily excluded state power and thus made
the new states unequal.240 Webster’s theory of divided sovereignty, however,
implied that, while the federal government might own and sell public lands
within a state, the state could otherwise retain power over its territory.241 The
fact that Congress’s power under the Property Clause had greater implications
within the new states than within the old thus no more violated equal sover-
eignty than the fact that Congress’s Commerce Clause power had greater im-
plications in the more commercialized Northeast.
Although Hayne and Webster fought to a draw in their debate over the
nature of the Union, they agreed that the constitutional argument for cession
lacked merit. Hayne, the famous prote´ge´ of John C. Calhoun and defender of
states’ rights, ridiculed the argument and asserted that state interests could not
affect Congress’s “absolute property” in federal land. Webster, the “Expounder
of the Constitution” and champion of the Union, comprehensively explained
why federal ownership was both necessary and constitutional.242 Benton’s call
234. Id.
235. 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819). For a more detailed account of Justice Marshall’s views, see gener-
ally JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 78–105, 155–214 (Ger-
ald Gunther ed., 1969).
236. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
237. 6 REG. DEB. 74 (1830).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 74–80.
240. See supra note 132. R
241. Barton made this same point on the Senate floor when arguing against cession. See 3 REG.
DEB. 43 (1827) (“[T]he answer to these new notions is, there is no such thing as absolute
State sovereignty over all subjects.”).
242. See ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 28–29, 162 (1997).
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for an alliance between the South and the West on the issue of public lands and
the tariff therefore failed.243
D. Calhoun’s Cession Bill
Throughout the 1830s, Congress debated proposals for distribution, grad-
uation, and preemption.244 The General Pre-emption Act of 1830 gave prefer-
ential rights to purchase land at the minimum federal price to squatters.245
Benton succeeded in pushing a graduation bill through the Senate in 1830, only
to have it die in the House.246 Clay emerged as the champion of distribution,247
which passed Congress in 1833 before being vetoed by President Jackson.248 By
this time, the public lands had become a partisan issue, with Jacksonians favor-
ing graduation and National Republicans supporting distribution. Although
some Westerners still sought cession, it had fallen from serious national discus-
sion by the early 1830s.249
In 1837, however, Calhoun shocked Congress by introducing a bill for the
cession of the public lands during a debate over graduation and preemption.250
Rather than giving the lands to the states outright, Calhoun’s bill included sev-
eral conditions, including the requirement that the states give the federal gov-
ernment one-third of any revenue derived from the sale of the land.251 Although
Calhoun claimed that he introduced the bill to end sectional conflict over the
public lands, he also hoped that Southern support for cession would induce the
West to aid the South on sectional issues like the tariff.252 Calhoun further
declared that he had “always felt the force of the argument that the new States
243. See FELLER, supra note 12, at 119–24. As Hayne made clear, the South was not willing to R
embrace cession of the public lands, as radicals in the West demanded. Southern opposition
to federal power also led them to oppose the federally-funded internal improvements sought
by the Northwest. The Northwest, moreover, favored the tariff to develop budding
manufacturing.
244. See id. at 125.
245. Id. at 129. The Act technically applied only to persons squatting on federal land at the time
of its enactment. It effectively applied prospectively as well, however, as everyone expected
that Congress would grant preferential treatment to new squatters in future legislation. Id.
246. Id. at 153.
247. See 6 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 181, at 447. R
248. GATES, supra note 12, at 13. Clay’s distribution bill gained Western support by giving an R
extra share of the revenue from land sales to the state in which in the land was sold. See
FELLER, supra note 12, at 148. It gained Southern support in exchange for Clay’s support for R
a compromise tariff. Id. at 162–71. Critics, however, argued that distribution was unconsti-
tutional because it violated the common benefit principle by favoring the public lands states.
See 6 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 181, at 451–56. R
249. FELLER, supra note 12, at 134, 178–79. R
250. Id. at 186.
251. 13 REG. DEB. 705, 730 (1837).
252. See id. at 735; WELLINGTON, supra note 12, at 58–60. R
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are not now placed upon an equal footing with the other members of the con-
federacy.”253 Moreover, he “sought to counteract the centralism, which was the
great danger of this Government, and thereby to preserve the liberties of the
people.”254
Several Western senators spoke in favor of cession. Senator Robert J.
Walker of Mississippi, for example, said he would vote for Calhoun’s bill be-
cause it would put the new states “on an equal footing with the other States of
the Union.”255 Senator Ambrose Hundley Sevier of Arkansas stated that the bill
“was the only measure which would give full and final satisfaction to the people
of the West.”256 Twenty senators, all of whom were from the West and the
South, ultimately voted for Calhoun’s cession bill.257
The bill, however, was tabled after harsh criticism from several of the Sen-
ate’s leading figures.258 James Buchanan of Pennsylvania called Calhoun’s pro-
posal “the most splendid bribe that had ever yet been offered.”259 It would, he
asserted, “give the entire public domain to the people of the new States, with-
out fee or reward, and on the single condition that they should not bring all the
land into the market at once.”260 Buchanan “solemnly protested against the
principle that Congress had any right, in equity or justice, to give what be-
longed to the entire people of the Union to the inhabitants of any State or
States whatever.”261
253. 13 REG. DEB. 705 (1837). Calhoun further asked: “And now I put it in the bosom of every
Senator, whether the mere moneyed income derived from the public domain is to be com-
pared for one moment to the great advantage of putting these Senators on the same indepen-
dent footing with ourselves?” Id. at 743.
254. Id. at 736. Calhoun argued that federal ownership of the public lands made the new states
“vassals” or “tenants” to the federal government and especially susceptible to the executive’s
patronage power. Id. at 742.
255. Id. at 731. Senator Gabriel Moore of Alabama similarly said that “the constitution certainly
looked to the time when those States would be free indeed, and no longer vassals under the
control of this Government, through the public lands.” Id. at 734.
256. Id. at 732.
257. WELLINGTON, supra note 12, at 63. Technically, they voted against tabling it. R
258. Twenty-six senators voted to table the bill, including the senators from Virginia, North
Carolina, and the Northeast, as well as one senator from each of Ohio and Kentucky. Id. at
63–64.
259. 13 REG. DEB. 731 (1837).
260. Id.
261. Id. Senator John Davis of Massachusetts likewise asserted that, because “the public lands are
public and common property, belonging to the whole people, and the whole people have a
right to the benefit of them,” Congress had no power to dispose of them for the “exclusive
benefit of the States in which the public lands lie.” Id. at 761, 766. Moreover, Senator Henry
Hubbard of New Hampshire declared that, although the argument that a new state had a
right to all the land within its borders had some support a decade ago, “it was now set up by
no one.” Id. at 792.
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Clay similarly declared that the public domain was “one of the most sacred
of all the sacred trusts confided to the General Government, and that they were
bound to take the utmost care of it, and to administer it fairly for the benefit of
all the States.”262 He thus opposed cession as a project “aimed to wrest the lands
from the common benefit of the Union, and appropriate them to the use either
of a small portion of the States or of speculators.”263
Webster gave the most comprehensive argument against Calhoun’s cession
bill. He began by arguing that the bill “transcended the power of Congress.”264
Congress had a duty, Webster asserted, “to make the public lands a common
fund for the benefit of the whole people of the Union.”265 The cession bill,
however, was a “gratuitous grant,” and Congress lacked the power to “give away
the public domain.”266 Even if Calhoun’s plan was not viewed as a gift to the
new states, Webster contended, the land could not be ceded to the states be-
cause, “by the constitution of the country, the trust, the management, the dis-
position of the public lands, was conferred on Congress.”267 He thus asked
whether “it was possible that any man could maintain the proposition that, as
they were placed in their hands, as belonging to the whole people of the United
States, they could transfer the general disposition of them?”268 Congress could
no more give away the power to dispose of the public lands, Webster con-
tended, than “assign to others the power of collecting the revenue of the cus-
tom-house in Boston.”269
Webster further argued that, “so far as respects the equality of footing
upon which the new States stood to the old, he saw no reason to impute inferi-
ority.”270 Merely owning the public domain, he explained, had not “encroached
on the sovereign power of the new States. The General Government exercised
no legislation over the land lying in a State, except so far as that State had
agreed to it.”271 Webster therefore used the same theory of divided sovereignty
that he had relied upon during his debate with Hayne over the nullification
crisis. While Congress had the power to own and sell the public lands, the
states otherwise had the power of legislation over all lands within their borders.
Because Easterners were solidly opposed to Calhoun’s cession bill, it was
quickly defeated.272 Calhoun’s plans to use the public land issue to forge an
262. Id. at 741.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 784–85.
265. Id. at 785. Senator Samuel Southard of New Jersey made the same argument. Id. at 790.




270. Id. at 785.
271. Id.
272. FELLER, supra note 12, at 186. R
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alliance between the West and the South died with the bill, and the land issue
became a creature of national party politics that transcended sectional lines.
While Whigs favored steady land prices and the distribution of revenue to the
states, Democrats advocated for low prices, graduation, and preemption for set-
tlers.273 As electoral fortunes changed over the 1840s and 1850s, Congress
passed distribution, graduation, and preemption acts.274 Neither national party,
however, favored the doctrine of cession. By the time party politics dis-
integrated with the coming Civil War, Westerners pushed for federal home-
steading laws rather than cession.275
E. Supreme Court Precedent
Court precedent on Congress’s power over the public lands is fully consis-
tent with the dominant opinion expressed in the antebellum Congress. Al-
though the Marshall Court never ruled on the constitutionality of federal land
ownership within an existing state, it held that Congress had unlimited power
over the territories. In American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,276 the
Court rejected a challenge to the legitimacy of congressionally established terri-
torial courts in Florida.277 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that Congress had “the combined powers of the general, and of a state
government” over the territories.278 This power, Marshall explained, derived
from a “general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue
of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations,
respecting the territory belonging to the United States.”279
The Taney Court reached the issue of Congress’s power to own land
within an existing state in a pair of cases in the 1840s. The first, United States v.
Gratiot,280 arose from a federal license to smelt lead ore on federal land in pre-
273. Id. The issue still had sectional influences, as some Western Whigs favored graduation and
many Eastern Democrats opposed it and supported distribution. Id.
274. When Whigs gained control of the national government, they passed the Distribution Act of
1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (1841). To gain Southern votes, however, the Act specified that
distribution would end if the tariff was raised above twenty percent. Because Congress raised
the tariff in 1842, distribution lasted for less than one year. See FELLER, supra note 12, at R
187–88.
275. See FELLER, supra note 12, at 188; VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 238–40. R
276. 26 U.S. 511 (1828).
277. Id. at 546. The plaintiff challenged an auction sale of 356 bales of cotton that had been made
pursuant to an order from a territorial court under the law of the territory of Florida. Id. at
513.
278. Id. at 546.
279. Id. The Court made similar statements in Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336–37
(1810).
280. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
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sent-day Illinois.281 When the defendants failed to pay as required under the
lease, the United States brought an action for debt.282 In a demurrer, the de-
fendants argued that the lease was invalid because, under the Property Clause,
“the lands are ‘to be disposed of’ by Congress; not ‘held by the United
States.’ ”283 Congress’s power to regulate, the defendant asserted, may have au-
thorized such a lease prior to statehood, but, after Illinois became a state, a
federal leasehold violated the state’s rights.284
The Gratiot Court broadly held that Congress has the power to lease fed-
eral land within a state and thus reserve it from sale.285 The Court explained
that the word “territory” in the Property Clause “is equivalent to the word
lands. And Congress has the same power over it as over any other property
belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in Congress without
limitation.”286 The Court further held that disposal was not limited to a power
to sell because “disposal must be left to the discretion of Congress.”287 “And
there can be no apprehensions of any encroachments upon state rights,” the
Court added, because Illinois “cannot claim a right to the public lands within
her limits.”288
The Court’s next significant Property Clause case, Pollard v. Hagan,289
arose from a dispute over land in Alabama that was situated within the tidal
zone of the Mobile River.290 The plaintiff in Pollard sought to eject the defen-
dant based on an 1836 grant of title from Congress, whereas the defendant
claimed the land under state law.291 The Court held that, although Congress
had plenary authority over the land while Alabama was a territory, Congress
had lost this power when Alabama became a state in 1819.292 The Court rea-
soned that, at the time of the Revolution, the sovereign power of the states
included “the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under
them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by
the Constitution.”293 Because Alabama inherited equal sovereign power when it
became a state, Congress’s attempt to convey the land after Alabama’s state-
hood was void.294
281. Id. at 527, 533.
282. See id. at 534.
283. Id. at 533.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 538.
286. Id. at 537.
287. Id. at 538.
288. Id.
289. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
290. Id. at 219–20.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 222–23.
293. Id. at 229 (quoting Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)).
294. See id.
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The Pollard Court, however, was careful to distinguish navigable waters
from other public lands. The Court stated that, even after a territory achieves
statehood, “the United States hold[s] the public lands within the new states by
force of the deeds of cession, and the statutes connected with them.”295 Federal
ownership, the Court further stated, did not completely displace state sover-
eignty over the land because the states possessed a “municipal right of sover-
eignty” over federally owned land.296 Although the Court did not directly
address the equal sovereignty argument against federal ownership, this division
of sovereignty helps to explain how the new states were sovereign equals despite
federal land ownership.297 In any event, the Court clearly approved of federal
land holding under the Property Clause after statehood. The issue of whether
Congress had a duty to dispose of this land, however, was not addressed.298
The Taney Court returned to the Property Clause in the infamous case of
Dred Scott v. Sandford.299 Scott claimed his freedom in part from being held in a
federal territory that prohibited slavery under the Missouri Compromise.300 Af-
ter finding that the federal courts lacked diversity jurisdiction because African-
Americans could not be U.S. citizens, Chief Justice Taney held that travel to
Missouri could not make Scott free because the Missouri Compromise’s ban on
slavery was unconstitutional.301 Taney began his analysis with the legally con-
295. Id. at 224.
296. Id. at 223. Justice Joseph Story took the same position in his highly influential treatise. See 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 189,
§ 1328 (2d ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851) (asserting that, on federal
land within a state, “the general jurisdiction of the state is not excluded in regard to the site,
but, subject to the rightful exercise of the [enumerated] powers of the national government,
it remains in full force.”). Justice Story also implicitly rejected the equal sovereignty argu-
ment by stating that “no less than eleven states have, in the space of little more than forty
years, been admitted into the union upon an equality with the original states.” Id. at 184,
§ 1319.
297. See supra notes 235–41, 270–71 and accompanying text (explaining how Webster used the R
same distinction between land ownership and sovereignty over the land that the Court iden-
tified in Pollard to refute the argument that federal land ownership violated the equal sover-
eignty principle).
298. Proponents of the duty to dispose read the cases differently. See Landever, supra note 9, at R
578–83. Their arguments, however, conflate regulatory power with the power to own prop-
erty. As stated above, the Court held that equal sovereignty dictated that the states had some
regulatory power over federal land after statehood. The issue of regulatory power, however,
has no bearing on whether Congress has a duty to dispose.
299. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
300. Id. at 519. Scott also claimed that he was free because he was held in the free state of Illinois.
Id. at 394.
301. Taney first held that Congress lacked the power to ban slavery as a “Rule or Regulation”
under the Property Clause because the Clause applied only to the territory held at the time
of Ratification. Id. at 436. He continued, however, to state that Congress had an inherent
authority to regulate newly acquired territories. Id. at 448. This power, Taney found, was
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troversial position that the protections contained in the Bill of Rights apply to
U.S. citizens in the territories.302 The Due Process Clause, he further reasoned,
protected private property rights, including property in slaves, from govern-
mental interference.303 Property in slaves was protected, he stated, because “no
word can be found in the Constitution which . . . entitles property of that kind
to less protection than property of any other description.”304 If any doubt re-
mained, he boldly claimed that the Constitution “distinctly and expressly af-
firmed” property in slaves by citing the Slave Trade and Fugitive Slave Clauses.
The Missouri Compromise’s prohibition on slavery thus violated the constitu-
tionally protected property rights of slave owners.305
Taney supported his Due Process argument by stating that a federal ban
on slavery would violate the fundamental principle that the territories must be
used for the “common and equal benefit” of the states.306 He explained:
“Whatever [Congress] acquires, it acquires for the benefit of the people of the
several States who created it. It is their trustee acting for them, and charged
with the duty of promoting the interests of the whole people of the Union in
the exercise of the powers specifically granted.”307 Taney argued that “because
the federal government was the mere trustee of the territories and each state
had an equal claim to them, the federal government could not discriminate
against the property of the citizens of” the slaveholding states.308
Although Dred Scott was a divisive decision that has been thoroughly repu-
diated with respect to slavery, the Justices’ opinions reveal the degree to which
the common benefit principle was accepted. Justices Curtis and McLean, who
vehemently dissented from Taney’s opinion for the Court, both endorsed the
common benefit principle.309 It was Taney’s recognition of a constitutionally
implied from Congress’s power to acquire new territory, which in turn was implied from the
power to admit new states. Id. at 447.
302. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
58–60 (2006).
303. Id. at 60–61.
304. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.
305. Id. at 450–52 (“[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could
hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law. . . .”).
306. Id. at 448; cf. GRABER, supra note 302, at 68 (“Laws banning slavery in the territories, jus- R
tices in the Dred Scott majority further insisted, violated the original understanding of consti-
tutional equality by unconstitutionally giving one class of citizens the right to the exclusive
use of jointly owned American possessions.”).
307. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 448.
308. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Constitutional Limitations on Extraterritorial State Power: State Regu-
lation, Choice of Law, and Slavery, 83 MISS. L.J. 59, 98–99 (2014).
309. See 60 U.S. at 549 (McLean, J., dissenting) (“It is said the Territories are common property
of the States, and that every man has a right to go there with his property. This is not
controverted.”); id. at 606 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he unsettled territory was viewed as
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protected property right in owning slaves in the territories that drew criticism,
not the common benefit principle.310
Like the congressional debates of the same era, early Supreme Court pre-
cedent thus supports three propositions: Congress could dispose of the federal
lands only for the common benefit of the states; Congress had a broad power to
own land within the states; and federal land ownership did not undermine
equal state sovereignty. Unlike the congressional debates, however, the Court
did not speak directly to the issue of whether Congress has the power to perma-
nently own significant portions of the land within a state. When the constitu-
tional argument for a duty to dispose arose in a concrete way in the early
nineteenth century, it was resolved in Congress rather than the Supreme Court.
IV. RECONSTRUCTION TO TODAY
Although federal land policy changed dramatically in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the meaning of the Property Clause did not. When West-
ern interests pushed for federal land in the 1910s, 1930s, and 1940s, Congress’s
power to permanently own land within the states was repeatedly challenged and
vindicated. The Supreme Court also directly confronted the issue during the
early twentieth century and held that permanent land ownership within the
states is constitutional and does not infringe on the sovereignty of the states.
More recent arguments against the constitutionality of federal land ownership
are therefore wholly at odds with the meaning consistently given to the Prop-
erty Clause throughout more than 200 years of constitutional history.
A. Federal Land Policy
Congress aggressively sold and transferred land to private parties through-
out the remainder of the nineteenth century. The most important disposal leg-
islation was the Homestead Act of 1862.311 Under the Act, a homesteader who
claimed, cultivated, and lived on federal land for five years could acquire title to
justly applicable to the common benefit, so far as it then had or might attain thereafter a
pecuniary value; and so far as it might become the seat of new States, to be admitted into the
Union upon an equal footing with the original States.”); GRABER, supra note 302, at 62, R
68–69.
310. See, e.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMER-
ICAN LAW AND POLITICS, 437–40 (1978). Taney’s opinion is also rightly criticized for re-
stricting the scope of Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause to the
territories originally held at the time of Ratification and thus ignoring the precedent of the
Northwest Ordinance’s ban on slavery.
311. An Act to secure Homesteads to actual Settlers on the Public Domain (Homestead Act of
1862), ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 161–164, repealed 1976).
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160 acres after paying land-office fees.312 Homesteaders used the Act to acquire
title to approximately 100 million acres by the turn of the century.313 Congress
granted a similar amount of land to railroad companies to encourage develop-
ment and therefore increase the value of nearby federal lands.314 In the words of
one commentator, “the public domain during this period is best characterized as
that of a real estate agent rather than a landlord.”315 As explained above, land
was seen as having value only because of its potential for development, and the
West was thought to be an area of unlimited resources.316
The Progressive Movement of the late nineteenth century, however,
changed attitudes towards federal land.317 Progressives valued efficiency highly,
and an efficient land policy required scientific management by professional fed-
eral officials.318 Because sale to private parties created waste and overuse, land
policy increasingly favored planned development under continuing federal man-
agement by a professional bureaucracy.319
As a result, by the late nineteenth century, Congress began to reserve large
amounts of federal land from private disposal.320 Congress created the first na-
tional park in 1872 when it reserved land from the Montana and Wyoming
Territories for the creation of Yellowstone.321 The Forest Reserve Act of 1891
then authorized the President to withdraw public lands from settlement and
private sale.322 Congress gave the President further authority to reserve federal
312. Id. §§ 161–162. Alternatively, homesteaders could purchase the land after just six months.
The Homestead Act of 1862, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://perma.cc/7H73-CHWX; FRED A.
SHANNON, THE FARMER’S LAST FRONTIER: AGRICULTURE, 1860–1897, at 53 (1945).
313. See RANDALL K. WILSON, AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS: FROM YELLOWSTONE TO SMOKEY
BEAR AND BEYOND 28 (2014). In 1908, Congress expanded the amount of land available in
more arid lands where 160 acres could not support a family. Homesteaders ultimately took
approximately 288 million acres of land. Id.
314. Id. at 29.
315. Id. at 24.
316. R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH RE-
BELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 16–17, 32 (1993).
317. Id. at 16.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 16–18; see also E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPO-
SAL AND RESERVATION POLICIES 1900–50, at 4 (1951) (“[A]n awakened public conscience
was beginning to decry the ‘squandering’ of the public domain in the past and was scrutiniz-
ing with greater care the uses to which it was being put in the present, with an idea of
preventing its waste in the future.”).
320. See, e.g., Blumm & Jamin, supra note 12, at 805. Congress gave the President the power to R
withdraw lands from disposal as early as 1817. Early Presidents, however, did not make
much use of this power. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 14–15. R
321. Yellowstone National Park Protection Act of 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 21–40c (2012)).
322. Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 471–546 (2012)).
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land in the Antiquities Act of 1906, which authorizes the designation of na-
tional monuments.323 Relying on this authority, President Theodore Roosevelt,
the “conservationist president,” reserved approximately 150 million acres of for-
est land from 1901 to 1909.324 Roosevelt helped to place an additional seventy
million acres under federal protection through the creation of national parks,
bird reserves, and monuments.325
Many Westerners, however, opposed Roosevelt’s actions. While they gen-
erally recognized the need for forest reserves, they opposed what Senator Carter
of Montana called the “extravagant and unreasonable” expansion of the national
forests in the early 1900s.326 Much like the advocates of cession in the 1830s,
they argued that permanent federal ownership was unconstitutional because it
infringed on state sovereignty and made the western states unequal to those in
the East.327
Henry A. Buchtel, the Governor of Colorado, called on the governors of
each state containing public lands to attend a 1907 convention “for the purpose
of discussing the relations of the states to the public lands.”328 Among the ques-
tions raised for discussion was the following: “Has the United States govern-
ment the constitutional right to hold the public lands within the borders of a
new state in perpetual ownership and under municipal sovereignty without the
consent of the state?”329 Some of the Western politicians in attendance an-
swered that question in the negative.330 The legal opinion prepared for the
Convention, however, concluded that, if the Supreme Court were to hear the
issue, it would “continue its decisions favorable to congressional power to do
323. American Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 431–433 (2012)). Significant amounts of federal land have been reserved under the An-
tiquities Act. President Obama, for example, reserved millions of acres by establishing or
expanding thirty-four national monuments. See Blumm & Jamin, supra note 12, at 806–07 R
n.191.
324. Theodore Roosevelt and Conservation, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://perma.cc/KB5V-RPD3.
325. Id.
326. 41 CONG. REC. 3200 (1907).
327. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 39. R
328. PROCEEDINGS OF THE PUBLIC LAND CONVENTION 4 (1907), https://perma.cc/G76N-
Q3SB [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. With the help of newspapers and dispatches, the con-
vention had convinced many that the West was opposed to permanent federal land reten-
tion. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 101. In reality, however, many Westerners believed that R
federal management was necessary to develop and manage the land, at least for a time.
Owners of arid land needed federal assistance to develop irrigation, for example, and, by the
turn of the century, most cattlemen preferred federal regulation to the inefficient and often
chaotic open range. See id. at 21, 39, 74–75, 83–88.
329. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 328, at 8. The Program Committee also raised other questions, R
including whether federal policy was in the best interests of the public land states. See id.
330. See, e.g., id. at 78 (Address of Robert W. Bonynge).
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what it sees fit with the public lands.”331 Most speakers at the convention there-
fore argued that withdrawing federal land from sale was wrong because the
people of the West had a right to develop it rather than because of any consti-
tutional doctrine.332 It is telling that, although many Westerners opposed fed-
eral land ownership and personally believed it unconstitutional, they understood
that raising the constitutional argument would be futile.333
Roosevelt responded to Western criticism by embarking on a campaign to
raise public support for the Conservation Movement.334 At a conference of gov-
ernors in 1908, for example, Roosevelt declared:
We are coming to recognize as never before the right of the Nation to
guard its own future in the essential matter of natural resources. In
the past we have admitted the right of the individual to injure the
future of the Republic for his own present profit. . . . The time has
come for a change. As a people we have the right and the duty, sec-
ond to none other but the right and duty of obeying the moral law, of
requiring and doing justice, to protect ourselves and our children
against the wasteful development of our natural resources . . . .335
The Conservation Movement gained widespread public support, and both ma-
jor party platforms officially supported it.336 At its core, the movement opposed
misuse of public land for personal gain and supported federal stewardship to
ensure sustainable use and preservation for future generations.337 The success of
the movement demonstrates that the public domain was not seen as the exclu-
sive property of the West or those who would develop it; instead, the public
increasingly came to view it as a shared resource for all.338
In 1910, President Taft called on Congress to enact legislation to em-
power the President to withdraw land whenever he determined that disposal
would not be in the public interest.339 Taft sought such legislation largely be-
331. Id. at 176. Ethelbert Ward, the author of the opinion and attorney of the Colorado Cattle &
Horse Growers’ Association, was careful to stress that his report reflected settled precedent,
even though his personal view was that Congress lacked such power. See id. at 170.
332. See, e.g., id. at 50 (“I do not contend that we have a right to seize the lands, but I do contend
that we have a right to put them to the use that God Almighty intended they should be put
to, and that the power of the government is a tyrannical power whenever it attempts to
interfere with the rights of the citizens to that extent.”).
333. Id.
334. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 102. R
335. Theodore Roosevelt, Opening Address by the President (May 13, 1908), in PROCEEDINGS
OF A CONFERENCE OF GOVERNORS 3, 10 (1909).
336. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 103. R
337. See, e.g., SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 71–72 (2d ed. 1980).
338. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 103. R
339. H.R. DOC. NO. 61-533 (1910).
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cause he believed that some of Roosevelt’s actions were questionable under ex-
isting statutes. He thus essentially asked Congress to ratify Roosevelt’s actions
and delegate the power to make permanent reservations to the executive.340
Although many congressmen, particularly from the West, opposed Taft’s
proposed legislation, there is no indication in the records of the debates that
anyone thought Congress lacked the power to pass it.341 For example, Senator
Clark of Wyoming, the principle opponent of the bill, warned that it “placed in
the hands of the Executive the absolute, undisputed control of the public lands
of the United States to act and do with as his judgment may dictate at any
time.”342 His argument, of course, assumes that Congress had such a power to
delegate.343 Senator Heyburn of Idaho, moreover, proposed an amendment that
would limit executive power to making recommendations regarding with-
drawal, “to the end that Congress may, in the performance of its constitutional
duty, enact such legislation.”344 His amendment was defeated, however, and the
bill authorizing the President to withdraw federal land from the disposal laws
easily passed on June 10, 1910, despite much Western opposition.345
By 1920, most of the 180 million acres still available for disposal were arid
and therefore suitable only for grazing livestock.346 Because this land remained
in the public domain, it was available for all to use as common grazing land.
Without regulations, however, it increasingly became clear that overgrazing was
destroying the commons and even threatened nearby lands due to serious soil
erosion.347 The cattlemen of the West therefore strongly supported federal leas-
ing to more efficiently manage the rangelands.348
This was a critical juncture in federal land policy. Although the federal
government had already withdrawn more than 200 million acres, the default
policy had always been that any land not so withdrawn would be sold. If Con-
340. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 115–16. R
341. Senator Bailey of Texas suggested that the lands be given to the states, but he did so because
he thought “a State can manage public lands better than the General Government has done”
rather than because of any constitutional duty. 45 CONG. REC. 7542 (1910). The Senator
was speaking from his state’s practical experience, as the federal government owns very little
land within Texas due to the unique circumstances of its admission.
342. 45 CONG. REC. 7538 (1910).
343. Clark further said: “Do we want to establish a crown-land system in this Nation, whose
public domain, the Constitution says, it is within the power of Congress to legislate and
prescribe rules and regulations for?” Id. at 7542.
344. Id. at 7552. The other Senator form Idaho, Borah, “with a great deal of reluctance” sup-
ported the original bill because he wished to establish the precedent that “the Executive must
yield to the rule established by the acts of Congress” on matters of public lands. Id. at 7543,
7549.
345. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 420, 36 Stat. 847 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 141–143).
346. PEFFER, supra note 319, at 169. R
347. Id. at 69.
348. Id. at 184.
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gress were to regulate the open range by leasing grazing land, however, virtually
all federal land would be withdrawn from sale, effectively making retention the
default. Many Westerners therefore argued that the federal lands should be
transferred to the states so that they could enact grazing regulations.349 Arizona
Governor George W.P. Hunt, for example, argued for transfer to the states
because permanent federal land ownership in the West “is repugnant to every
vital and fundamental principle underlying the Constitution.”350 In the words of
Charles E. Winter, Representative from Wyoming, because of the dire state of
the open range, the situation “has come to a culmination, and I believe that
those who hold the view of leaving things as they are will be compelled finally
to come to a choice between regulation by the State or regulation by the Fed-
eral Government.”351
In 1929, President Hoover proposed that Congress transfer the remaining
federal land to the states. He declared that “our Western States have long since
passed from their swaddling clothes and are to-day more competent to manage
much of these affairs than is the Federal Government. Moreover, we must seek
every opportunity to retard the expansion of Federal bureaucracy and to place
our communities in control of their own destinies.”352 At Hoover’s behest, Con-
gress formed the Committee on the Conservation and Administration of the
Public Domain,353 and, pursuant to its recommendation, a bill was introduced
in Congress to give the states the option to take title to all remaining unre-
served lands, exclusive of mineral rights.354 Under the bill, if a state declined the
land, federal districts would be created to regulate grazing.355
Public reaction to Hoover’s proposal was generally not supportive. Al-
though some Easterners supported the bill because they felt the states should
have to bear the burden of maintaining the lands within their borders, others
opposed giving the land away for nothing.356 Conservationists strongly opposed
the bill because, in the words of Gifford Pinchot, “the national forests belong to
all the people of all the States.”357 Moreover, the American Forestry Association
declared that it “stands for inviolate retention of the lands and natural resources
349. Support for state ownership increased throughout the 1920s as Congress failed to pass a
leasing law. See id. at 199–200.
350. 67 CONG. REC. 7911 (1926). Hunt argued that permanent federal ownership undermined
state sovereignty and independence in the West. Id.
351. Granting Remaining Unreserved Public Lands to the States: Hearings on H.R. 5840 Before the
H. Comm. on the Public Lands, 72nd Cong. 118–19 (1932) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement
of Hon. Charles E. Winter).
352. 71 CONG. REC. 3571 (1929).
353. CAWLEY, supra note 316, at 72. R
354. Hearings, supra note 351, at 1–4. R
355. Id. at 5.
356. PEFFER, supra note 319, at 206. R
357. Hearings, supra note 351, at 219 (statement by Hon. Gifford Pinchot). R
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which now belong to our people as a perpetual and inalienable trust to be used
for the common benefit . . . .”358
Westerners also generally opposed the bill.359 Utah Governor George H.
Dern, for example, stated: “The States already own, in their school-land grants,
millions of acres of this same kind of land, which they can neither sell nor lease,
and which is yielding no income. Why should they want more of this precious
heritage of desert?”360 Although much Western opposition stemmed from the
fact that the proposal excluded mineral rights and national forests, as Winter
stated, “some States in the West appear, at this time at least, to favor a national
range or Federal regulation over the balance of the domain.”361 In the words of
John M. Macfarlane, President of the Utah Cattle and Horse Growers’ Associ-
ation, “none of the States in the West [are] in a position to take hold of that
range and build it up as it ought to be done.”362
During hearings on the bill, however, several Westerners raised the consti-
tutional argument for state ownership of the land. In a memorial presented at
the hearings, for example, the Wyoming legislature declared that “the control
asserted by the Federal Government is a growth of a system nowhere even
contemplated by the founders of our Government and in violation of the sover-
eignty of states which came in to the Federal Union on an equal footing with
the original States in all respects . . . .”363 Governor Dern, moreover, asserted
that “the States of the West have always felt that every State that is admitted
358. Id. at 231. These statements were echoed in many letters to Congress opposing the bill. See
id. at 225–37.
359. PEFFER, supra note 319, at 207. R
360. Hearings, supra note 351, at 14. Arizona Governor W.P. Hunt similarly said that “at present R
this land is unsalable at nearly any figure.” Id. at 237.
361. Id. at 118. Some Westerners worried that, among other things, the states did not have suffi-
cient resources to manage the land, uniformity of regulations would be lost, and the states
would lose access to federal funding that was tied to the land. See id.; PEFFER, supra note
319, at 208. Others opposed the bill, moreover, because they considered the “public domain R
a heritage for all our people of the entire United States.” Hearings, supra note 351, at 168 R
(statement of David L. Geyer, a United States Land Officer from New Mexico).
362. Hearings, supra note 351, at 204. R
363. Id. at 193. Interestingly, the legislature cited a speech made in 1828 by Senator Hendricks of
Indiana. A number of men from Wyoming made similar arguments at the hearings on the
bill. See id. at 143 (Charles E. Winter, Representative from Wyoming) (“The Government is
a trustee, not an absolute, permanent owner . . . . Let us complete the jurisdiction and
equality of the States.”); id. at 171 (Thomas Cooper, President of the Wyoming Wool
Growers’ Association) (“We do not want any Federal Control. We feel that the people of
Wyoming are equal in their rights and in their citizenship with the people of any of the
other States.”); id. at 188 (Perry Jenkins, member of the Committee on the Conservation
and Administration of the Public Domain) (“We feel . . . that we have not had what the
Constitution offered us or said that we should have, or that the treaties said we should have,
and that is complete sovereignty within our State.”). Arthur H. King, register of the State
Board of Land Commissioners of Colorado, similarly argued that the bill should not reserve
mineral rights to the federal government in part because “in equity and justice, all of the
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into the Union on an equal footing with the original thirteen States is the right-
ful sovereign over all the lands within its borders . . . .”364
Like during the 1830s, however, the constitutional argument for transfer
to the states was not within mainstream opinion. Representative Claude Fuller
of Arkansas declared that the constitutional argument was “not correct,” and
even Governor Dern admitted that it was not “legally true.”365 Most Westerners
also did not take the equal sovereignty argument to its logical conclusion. Dern,
for example, declared that the states were “pretty well satisfied with the national
forests” and “it is entirely futile to think of getting the national forests turned
over to the States.”366
In fact, although the bill would have granted approximately 180 million
acres of federal land to the states, it was inconsistent with the constitutional
argument for state ownership. When viewed in combination with other pend-
ing legislation, the bill would have allowed the states to take title to the unre-
served lands, but, if they failed to do so, the executive would have organized
them into federal grazing districts.367 Moreover, the bill did not apply to some
200 million acres of federal land that had already been reserved. The legislation
thus contemplated extensive and permanent federal land ownership within the
states.
After the push for state ownership failed, Congress finally closed the open
range by regulating grazing on some 142 million acres of public land in the
1936 Amendments to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.368 Although the Act
technically authorized sales to homesteaders, it also allowed the executive to
classify land and withhold it from disposal.369 After the Dust Bowl laid waste to
the country during the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sub-
jected virtually all remaining public land to classification in a pair of executive
orders signed in 1934 and 1935.370 From that time forward, only land classified
unappropriated public lands belong to the State and that the Federal Government is simply
holding title as trustee.” Id. at 46.
364. Id. at 14.
365. Id. at 14–15. Dern said the argument was “equitably true.” Id.
366. Id. at 15. Winter, another representative who raised constitutional arguments, similarly did
not challenge federal reserves. Id. at 130. Instead, he argued that “the Western States that are
now asking for these cessions to them are simply attempting to preserve that balanced gov-
ernment between the Federal power and the States which is provided in the Constitution.”
Id. Jenkins, however, did argue that all federal land should be ceded to the states. Id. at
189–91.
367. Id. at 5 (Memorandum from Northcutt Ely for Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the
Interior).
368. An Act to Amend the Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 842, tit. I, 49 Stat. 1976 (1936) (codified as
amended in scattered subsections of 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012)).
369. Id.
370. PEFFER, supra note 319, at 224; see Exec. Order No. 6910, 54 Interior Dec. 539 (1934); R
Exec. Order No. 6964, 55 Interior Dec. 188 (1935).
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as suitable for agriculture was available for homesteaders. Because the Depart-
ment of the Interior intentionally made the classification system slow and oner-
ous, little federal land was disposed after FDR’s orders.371 Federal lands were
instead leased to grazers, and the executive withdrew an additional 15 million
acres for national defense during the war.372 By closing the open range, Con-
gress asserted its right to indefinite ownership.
While federal land policy in the early twentieth century was largely based
on the desire to end waste and make productive use of the land, attitudes to-
wards federal land again began to shift during the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury.373 Not only did public concern about the environment rise, but increasing
numbers of Americans began to use their disposable income on outdoor recrea-
tion activities on federal lands.374 Environmentalists who advocated for preser-
vation of nature rather than sustainable resource use therefore gained
considerable influence.375 As a result, federal officials often limited resource use
to allow for recreation and the preservation of nature rather than pursuing the
old policies of maximum sustained yield.376 National opinion and policy there-
fore became even more committed to federal ownership and regulation.
Increasing withdrawals and regulations, however, predictably fueled an-
other revolt by certain elements within the West. During the early part of the
1940s, Senator Patrick McCarran of Utah, a vocal critic of federal land man-
agement, succeeded in gutting appropriations for the Grazing Service and thus
effectively put the lands under the control of local grazing interests.377 With
McCarran’s support, Western livestock associations then called for the sale of
federal grazing land, including land within national forests, in 1946 and
1947.378 Conservationists, hunters, fishermen, and dude-ranchers alike, how-
ever, accused the stockmen of trying to steal the people’s land for their own
gain.379 Westerners also worried that sale to private stockmen would undermine
federal assistance with irrigation and the development of recreation as both a
pastime and a business.380 Even within the West, therefore, the proposal to sell
grazing lands was extremely unpopular,381 and it generated little interest in
371. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 257–58; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE R
INTERIOR 136 (1940) (“During recent years there has been a marked change . . . . The
former system of land disposals . . . has been superseded to a large extent by the present
systems of leasing.”).
372. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 259. R
373. See CAWLEY, supra note 316, at 18. R
374. Id. at 18–19.
375. Id. at 11.
376. Id. at 31–33.
377. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 272–78; CAWLEY, supra note 316, at 73–74. R
378. See PEFFER, supra note 319, at 280. R
379. Id. at 282.
380. Id. at 289.
381. Id. at 279–93.
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Congress.382 By mid-century, the country not only opposed giving the federal
lands to the states, but also overwhelming rejected large-scale sale to local land
users.
Congress formally adopted retention of federal land as the government’s
default policy in the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976
(“FLPMA”).383 FLPMA also gives the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)
broad authority to manage public lands, and, in doing so, directs the BLM to
balance environmental interests and resource use. It not only directs the BLM
to manage “in a manner which recognizes the Nation’s need for domestic
sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from the public lands,” but it also
commands the BLM to “protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, eco-
logical, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resources, and archeological
values.”384 Whereas Congress acted as a real estate agent throughout the eight-
eenth century, FLPMA demonstrates that the federal government now acts as a
permanent landlord of the public domain.
In sum, the federal government began claiming permanent ownership of
federal land in the late nineteenth century, and, as a practical matter, Congress
expanded that claim to all federal land over time. Although certain elements
within the West have repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of such policy,
the constitutional argument against federal ownership has never been widely
accepted. Instead, the federal government has taken the side of conservationists
who saw the federal lands as resource to be preserved for all the people of the
United States.
B. Court Precedent
Although the Court did not directly rule on the issue of permanent federal
ownership during the late nineteenth century, dicta in several cases shows that
the Court had a broad understanding of Congress’s power to own land.385 In
382. Id.
383. Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012)) (stating that federal lands would “be retained in Federal owner-
ship, unless . . . it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national
interest.”).
384. Id.
385. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (“While the lands in question
are all within the state of Colorado, the government has, with respect to its own lands, the
rights of an ordinary proprietor, to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. It
may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming property.
It may sell or withhold them from sale.”) (emphasis added); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504,
514 (1896) (noting that Congress may hold land “in private ownership within a state”); Fort
Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531 (1885) (recognizing Congress’s right to
own land even when not “used as a means to carry out the purposes of government”); Grisar
v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363, 381 (1868) (“[F]rom an early period in the history of the govern-
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Gibson v. Chouteau, for example, the Court held that federal land could not be
taken through a state law of equitable title based on possession.386 In doing so,
the Gibson Court stated:
With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Con-
gress the power of disposition and of making all needful rules and
regulations. That power is subject to no limitations. Congress has the
absolute right to prescribe the times, the conditions, and the mode of
transferring this property, or any part of it, and to designate the per-
sons to whom the transfer shall be made. No State legislation can
interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise.387
Because a constitutional obligation to dispose of federal land would be inconsis-
tent with a power that is “subject to no limitations,” the Gibson Court’s dicta
supports a broad reading of congressional power. Indeed, no language in any of
the Court’s late nineteenth-century or early twentieth-century cases suggests
that Congress has a duty to dispose under the Property Clause.
The issue of whether Congress has the power to indefinitely own land
within the states was finally presented to the Court in the 1911 case of Light v.
United States.388 Much like the Cliven Bundy incident of 2014,389 Light arose
from a dispute over grazing cattle on federal land. The defendant in Light regu-
larly grazed his cattle on the federal Holy Cross Forest Reserve in violation of
federal regulations.390 According to the Court, “When notified to remove the
cattle, he declined to do so, and threatened to resist if they should be driven off
by a forest officer.”391 After he was enjoined from grazing on the reserve, the
defendant challenged the regulations, in part, by arguing “that Congress cannot
constitutionally withdraw large bodies of land from settlement without the con-
sent of the state where it is located.”392 If Congress lacked the power to reserve
federal land, the defendant maintained, the federal regulation preventing his
grazing would be void.
ment it has been the practice of the President to order, from time to time, as the exigencies
of the public service required, parcels of land belonging to the United States to be reserved
from sale and set apart for public uses.”).
386. 80 U.S. 92 (1871).
387. Id. at 99.
388. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
389. Cliven Bundy led an armed standoff against federal officials who sought to seize his cattle for
illegally grazing on federal land. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, A Defiant Rancher Savors the
Audience That Rallied to His Side, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), https://perma.cc/HPY2-
S6NU.
390. 220 U.S. at 534.
391. Id. at 535.
392. Id. at 535–36.
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The Court in Light held that Congress had the power to permanently own
land within the states under the Property Clause.393 The Court stated: “The
United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may
be used. As it can withhold or reserve the land, it can do so indefinitely.”394 The
only limitation on Congress’s power to own land, the Court stated, was that
“the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole
country.”395 The Court emphasized, however:
[I]t is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered.
That is for Congress to determine. The courts cannot compel it to set
aside the lands for settlement, or to suffer them to be used for agri-
cultural or grazing purposes, nor interfere when, in the exercise of its
discretion, Congress establishes a forest reserve for what it decides to
be national and public purposes.396
When the Court finally decided the issue in the early twentieth century, there-
fore, it reached the same conclusion that Congress had reached nearly one hun-
dred years earlier.
In other opinions, the Court also rejected the argument for state owner-
ship based on the principle of equal sovereignty.397 In Stearns v. Minnesota,398
for example, the Court discussed language in Minnesota’s enabling act and
Constitution that exempted federal land from taxation after statehood.399 In
justifying federal landownership and tax exemption, the Court stated:
393. Kochan, however, argues that this holding is dicta. See Kochan, supra note 2, at 1177–78. R
According to Kochan, “The Light opinion used that broad rhetorical language only as dicta
in reaching a far narrower and unexceptional holding that the federal government had the
power—like any owner—to expel trespassers.” Id. at 1178. Kochan, however, fails to ac-
knowledge that the Court considered the defendant’s argument that the regulations reserving
the federal land and preventing his grazing were unconstitutional because Congress lacked
the power to “withdraw large bodies of land from settlement without the consent of the State
where it is located.” Light, 220 U.S. at 535–36. The Court’s rejection of this argument was
necessary to the resolution of the case, and therefore its conclusion regarding Congress’s
power to own land indefinitely was a holding rather than dicta. Regardless, Light shows that
the Court believed Congress has such a power.
394. Light, 220 U.S. at 536.
395. Id. at 537.
396. Id.
397. Of course, the Court in Light implicitly rejected this argument by holding that Congress
could indefinitely own land within the states. See id. at 536.
398. 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
399. Id. at 240. The case involved a railroad’s Contracts Clause challenge to a state law that
revoked tax benefits the state had given to the railroad at the time the land was sold. The
Court held that the legislation violated the Contracts Clause because the state had formed a
contract with the railroad when it sold the land. Although the state legislature ordinarily
would lack the power to grant such tax benefits, the Court held, Congress’s conveyance of
the land to Minnesota for the purpose of railroad construction empowered the state to ex-
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It has often been said that a state admitted into the Union enters
therein in full equality with all the others, and such equality may for-
bid any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights
and obligations; whereas, on the other hand, a mere agreement in
reference to property involves no question of equality of status.400
The Court, like Webster and others in Congress, thus rejected the equal sover-
eignty argument by distinguishing between state sovereignty and property
ownership.401
The Court consistently followed this precedent throughout the first half of
the twentieth century.402 In United States v. City and County of San Francisco,403
for example, the Court broadly stated that “the power over the public land thus
entrusted to Congress is without limitations. ‘And it is not for the courts to say
how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.’ ”404
The Court further declared that Congress’s power over federal lands was “com-
plete,” “without limitations,” and could be used to achieve Congress’s “views of
public policy.”405
With the country increasingly in favor of permanent federal land owner-
ship, the Court announced its most expansive reading of the Property Clause in
empt the land from the normal rules for taxation because federal land is exempt from state
taxation. Id.
400. Id. at 245.
401. In a concurring opinion in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954), Justice Reed similarly
stated:
The fact that Alabama and the defendant states were admitted into the Union
upon the same footing with the original states, in all respects whatever, does not
affect Congress’ power to dispose of federal property. The requirement of equal
footing does not demand that courts wipe out diversities in the economic aspects of
the several States, but calls for parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.
The power of Congress to cede property to one state without corresponding cession
to all states has been consistently recognized.
Id. at 275 (internal citations omitted). Alabama v. Texas upheld the constitutionality of the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, which granted title to certain submerged lands to bordering
states. Id. Alabama and Rhode Island had argued that granting title to some coastal states
violated equal sovereignty because those states would possess power over the ocean that other
states lacked. Id.
402. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 336 (1936) (“The United States owns the coal, or the
silver, or the lead, or the oil, it obtains from its lands, and it lies in the discretion of the
Congress, acting in the public interest, to determine of how much of the property it shall
dispose.”); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404 (1917) (finding
state jurisdiction in federal land “does not extend to any matter that is not consistent with
full power in the United States to protect its lands, to control their use, and to prescribe in
what manner others may require rights in them”).
403. 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
404. Id. at 29–30 (quoting Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911)).
405. Id.
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the seminal case of Kleppe v. New Mexico in 1974.406 Kleppe arose from a consti-
tutional challenge to the federal Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act,
which protected wild horses and burros on federal land.407 A rancher com-
plained to state authorities that wild burros were eating his feed and harassing
his livestock that were legally grazing on federal land. The state authorities
rounded up the burros on federal land and sold them at public auction pursuant
to the New Mexico Estray Law.408 The BLM then commanded the state to
return the animals.409 Instead of complying, New Mexico filed suit seeking a
declaratory judgement that the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act was
unconstitutional.
The Kleppe Court held that “the Property Clause gives Congress the
power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding.”410 In
doing so, the Court rejected the state’s argument that the Property Clause
granted Congress only: “(1) the power to dispose of and make incidental rules
regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal prop-
erty.”411 Instead, the Court asserted, Congress “exercises the powers both of a
proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain,” and its power over fed-
eral property is “without limitations.”412 Congress had found that wild burros
were “an integral part of the natural system of the public lands,” and the Court
did not question this conclusion because “determinations under the Property
Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress.”413 It would be very
difficult to square this expansive language with any constitutional duty to divest
the public lands.414
In sum, federal policy and precedent have increasingly supported perma-
nent federal ownership and control of the public lands. The Court squarely
rejected the constitutional argument in the early twentieth century, and the
cases have only been more deferential to Congress over time. As in so many
406. 426 U.S. 529, 546–47 (1974).
407. Id. at 531–34.
408. Id. at 533.
409. Id. at 534.
410. Id. at 546.
411. Id. at 536.
412. Id. at 539–40.
413. Id. at 535–36.
414. See United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying on Kleppe and Light to
hold that Congress has the power to permanently own and regulate land within the states).
Nevertheless, Kochan argues that Kleppe “has limited value” because the Court’s expansive
language is dictum. Kochan, supra note 2, at 1173–74. Technically, Kochan may be correct. R
Nevertheless, the Court’s language in Kleppe conveys a broad understanding of Congress’s
power under the Property Clause. While this language may not be technically binding on
lower courts today, it is a strong and persuasive marker of historical understanding. Moreo-
ver, as argued above, the Court’s earlier decision in Light squarely held that Congress has the
power to hold land indefinitely. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
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other areas of constitutional law, Congress, the President, the Supreme Court,
and the People have announced progressively expansive views of Congress’s
Power to Dispose.
C. Modern Developments: The Sagebrush Rebellion
and Land Transfer Movement
Western radicals again challenged Congress’s power to own land within
the states during the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s. During the
1960s and 1970s, the federal government expanded wilderness lands,415 reduced
grazing allotments,416 regulated mining, and restricted the use of off-road vehi-
cles.417 Many Westerners became convinced that, although FLPMA repre-
sented a compromise between use and protection, federal officials favored
environmental interests when implementing the law.418 The Sagebrush Rebels
therefore demanded that the federal government transfer ownership of federal
land to the states, which they thought would be more responsive to resource
development.419
The Sagebrush Rebellion achieved significant success at the state level. In
1979, Nevada passed legislation claiming ownership to all federal land within
the state managed by the BLM.420 Nevada thus claimed approximately forty-
eight million acres, which represents seventy-nine percent of the land within its
borders. Alaska, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming all passed similar
legislation, and several other western states passed resolutions or began studying
the issue.421 The Rebels galvanized local support in part by arguing that federal
ownership violated state sovereignty, just as Ninian Edwards and other advo-
cates of cession had done 150 years earlier.422 Recognizing that legal precedent
was not in their favor, however, the Sagebrush Rebels pushed for a political
solution in the 1980 election rather than a court ruling.423
Because the Sagebrush Rebellion was a protest against restrictive federal
land policies, it faded with the election of Ronald Reagan. Reagan appointed
415. The wilderness system expanded from 9.1 million acres in 1964 to 80 million acres in 1980.
CAWLEY, supra note 316, at 43. R
416. Authorized animal unit months decreased by thirty-six percent from 1959 to 1978. Id. at 51.
417. Id. at 62–64.
418. Id. at 42.
419. Id. at 70.
420. Id. at 1.
421. Id. at 2. California, Colorado, and Montana also funded studies related to the Sagebrush
Rebellion, and Hawaii and North Dakota passed resolutions in support of the movement. Id.
422. Id. at 96–101.
423. Id. In 1996, however, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada held that
the Nevada law was unconstitutional after Nye County relied on the law when opening a
local road into a national forest in violation of an order from the U.S. Forest Service. See
United States v. Nye County, 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1109–10, 1114 (D. Nev. 1996).
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James G. Watt, a self-identified Sagebrush Rebel, as Secretary of the Interior.
With Watt promoting resource use over preservation, it became clear that the
environmentalists would no longer dominate federal policy.424 The Sagebrush
Rebellion and its demands for state ownership of federal land thus subsided in
the early 1980s.425
In recent years, however, the Sagebrush Rebellion has reemerged in what I
will call the “land transfer movement.”426 Utah led the way in 2012 by passing
legislation demanding that the federal government extinguish title to over thirty
million acres of land in the state.427 Within the last several years, state legisla-
tors have considered similar legislation in most of the western states.428 Al-
though legally meaningless without federal cooperation, state land transfer
legislation has been successful in raising the salience of the issue and galvaniz-
ing local support.
In 2016, for example, Ammon Bundy and a group of armed militants oc-
cupied the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge for forty-one days to protest the
“oppression” of federal landownership in the West.429 Although the occupation
was clearly illegal, a jury acquitted Bundy and six co-defendants of most federal
charges in October 2016 after a six-week trial that focused on constitutional
arguments as much as the facts of the case.430 The occupation and Bundy’s
dramatic acquittal demonstrate the level of popular support for the movement
in much of the West.431
424. See CAWLEY, supra note 316, at 12. Watt resigned in 1983 in part due to opposition to
Reagan’s proposal to convert federal lands to private property. Id. at 3.
425. Id. at 12–13. As the County Supremacy Movement of the 1990s demonstrates, however, the
Sagebrush Rebellion never completely died out in the West. See Lawton, supra note 8, at
12–13.
426. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Interior Secretary Cites Risk of “Extreme Movement to Seize Public
Lands”, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/NG3C-FH6Q; Jack Healy &
Kirk Johnson, The Larger, but Quieter Than Bundy, Push to Take Over Federal Land, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/C44J-24R2.
427. See Transfer of Public Lands Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to 104 (West 2017);
Tim Gaynor & David Schwartz, Arizona Governor Vetoes Law Demanding Return of Federal
Lands, REUTERS (May 14, 2012), https://perma.cc/A33M-QUHH.
428. Although it was ultimately vetoed, the Arizona legislature passed a similar legislation, and
analogous bills were debated in Colorado, Nevada, and Washington. See Gaynor &
Schwartz, supra note 427;  KEITER & RUPLE, supra note 8, at 2. Moreover, Idaho, Montana, R
Nevada, and Wyoming have all commissioned studies on the issue. See KEITER & RUPLE,
supra note 8, at 2. Wyoming is now considering a constitutional amendment that would
enable it to manage the public lands. See Kirk Siegler, Push To Transfer Federal Lands To
States Has Sportsmen On Edge, NPR (Jan. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/U662-PQAU.
429. See Sottile, supra note 6. R
430. Id. Only two years earlier, Ammon’s father, Cliven Bundy, had led an armed standoff against
federal officials who sought to seize his cattle for illegally grazing on federal land. See
Nagourney, supra note 389. R
431. See Sottile, supra note 6. R
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Now, for the first time in decades, federal land transfer legislation has a
real chance of passage. Like the Sagebrush Rebellion, the land transfer move-
ment is intimately associated with the Republican Party in the West.432 Not
only is land transfer legislation championed by state politicians, but also na-
tional party leaders such as Rand Paul, Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and Robert
Bishop, the Chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, have pub-
licly endorsed the transfer of federal lands to the states.433 The American Lands
Council, a conservative nonprofit that pushes for land transfer, has received
support from thousands of elected officials and mega-donors such as Americans
for Prosperity, the group run by the Koch brothers.434 The 2016 Republican
platform, moreover, called for the federal government to “convey certain feder-
ally controlled public lands to states.”435
On January 3, 2017, House Republicans introduced two measures to facil-
itate the transfer of federal land to the states. First, Republican Don Young
introduced a bill to allow the states to purchase National Forest System land.436
Second, the House changed the manner in which the Congressional Budget
Office accounts for the transfer of federal land.437 The new rules make it easier
for Congress to transfer land to the states by specifying that such a transfer
“shall not be considered as . . . decreasing revenues,” even if the land had been
leased out for activities such as logging or grazing.438 According to Representa-
tive Raul Grijalva, the top Democrat on the Natural Resources Committee, the
new rule allows “Congress to give away every single piece of property we own,
for free, and pretend we have lost nothing of any value.”439
432. See Healy & Johnson, supra note 426. R
433. See Stephanie Mencimer, It’s Not Just Militia Members Who Want to Take Over Federal Land,
MOTHER JONES (Jan. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/4C97-RH79; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Ben
Carson’s Claim that the Federal Government Should ‘Return’ Public Land to the States, WASH.
POST (Dec. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/HGY9-ZDHM.
434. Healy & Johnson, supra note 426; Nigel Duara, In Western States, Idea of Reclaiming Federal R
Land Still Has a Strong Allure, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/PX5S-F3A9;
see also John O’Connell, Federal Land Ownership Battle Heads for Court, CAPITAL PRESS
(Feb. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/8Z7K-AW4C.
435. REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, AMERICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES: AGRICULTURE, ENERGY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, https://perma.cc/XLK2-9F2K. The platform also states that fed-
eral ownership of the public lands “places an economic burden on counties and local commu-
nities” and that it “is absurd to think that all that acreage must remain under the absentee
ownership or management of official Washington.” Id.; see also Jeff Mapes, GOP Platform
Supports Transferring Western Public Lands to States, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (July 20,
2016), https://perma.cc/SKD5-YPU4.
436. State National Forest Management Act, H.R. 232, 115th Cong. (2017).
437. Juliet Eilperin, House GOP Rules Will Make It Easier to Sell Off Federal Land, WASH. POST
(Jan. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZGA2-YVWG.
438. Id.
439. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\42-2\HLE203.txt unknown Seq: 60  3-JUL-18 10:59
512 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 42
Although President Trump has not pushed for land transfer to the states,
he has not clearly opposed it. During the campaign, Trump opposed land
transfer in an interview with Field & Stream, supported it during a fundraiser in
Nevada, and then reportedly failed to respond to a letter from forty sporting
and conservation groups asking him to clarify his position.440 Trump’s Secretary
of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, explicitly opposed land transfer during his confir-
mation hearings, but he also voted for the 2017 legislation described above as a
representative from Montana.441 As such, Congress appears receptive to land
transfer, and the Trump Administration has given conflicting signals.
Although economic and political forces are also at play, constitutional ar-
guments against permanent federal land ownership lend emotional and intellec-
tual force to the movement.442 Like earlier movements against federal land
ownership, advocates of transfer argue that, because control over territory is an
incident of sovereignty, federal ownership of roughly half of the land within
only the western states violates the fundamental principle of equal state sover-
eignty.443 Disposal is constitutionally required under originalist constitutional
principles, they further assert, because the framing generation intended to dis-
pose of virtually all the land within the first public land states.444
440. Tay Wiles, Trump met with a leader of the land transfer movement, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Oct. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/L292-6K3P.
441. See Emmarie Huetteman, Nominee for Interior Vows to Preserve, and Develop, Public Lands,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/N53Q-TAQ9; Jimmy Tobias, Opinion, Pub-
lic Lands in Private Hands?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/8EAA-N839.
Zinke has also recently been attacked by outdoor and environmental groups for recom-
mending that the federal government decrease the size of Bears Ears National Monument, a
1.3 million acre protected area. See Julie Turkewitz & Coral Davenport, Interior Secretary
Recommends Shrinking Borders of Bears Ears Monument, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://
perma.cc/8DZD-X9GP.
442. Ammon Bundy’s militia group, some of the most fanatical devotees to the movement, for
example, called themselves the “Citizens for Constitutional Freedom.” Ammon also carried a
pocket Constitution to his daily press conferences during his occupation and frequently in-
voked the Constitution to justify his actions at trial. See Sottile, supra note 6; see also CAW- R
LEY, supra note 316, at 6–7, 96–101 (arguing that the constitutional argument helps explain R
Western devotion to the Sagebrush Rebellion).
443. Wentz & Howard, supra note 7; Rocky Barker, Public Lands Bills Come to Head in Idaho
Legislature, IDAHO STATESMAN (Mar. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/AYP4-UGY6 (quoting
the attorney who headed the panel that analyzed the land transfer issue for Idaho and ex-
plaining that the panel’s argument in favor of land transfer rests on the principle of equal
sovereignty); Get the Facts, AM. LANDS COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/Y5F7-UTQM (con-
tending that state ownership is necessary to “#HonorThePromise of Statehood”).
444. JOHN W. HOWARD ET AL., LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL CONSULTING SERVICES
TEAM PREPARED FOR THE UTAH COMMISSION FOR THE STEWARDSHIP OF PUBLIC
LANDS 4 (2015), https://perma.cc/UZ9S-9WFD (“[T]he Framers intended to grant the
power to regulate public lands only in the context of their disposal, not to permanently retain
the majority of the land within a State.”).
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Environmentalists and outdoor enthusiasts, however, oppose land transfer
by arguing that state ownership could end public access and cause environmen-
tal degradation.445 The federal government spends billions of dollars each year
protecting and maintaining public lands. Because the expense of managing the
lands would be a large percentage of state budgets, any economic setback, such
as a drop in the price of natural resources taken from the land, could force the
states to sell to the highest bidder.446 Outdoor enthusiasts—hunters, fishermen,
hikers, rock climbers, etc.—thus oppose land transfer by arguing that the fed-
eral government must ensure public access to the lands because they are an
“American birthright” that “belongs to all of us.”447
V. SUMMARIZING THE HISTORY AND APPLYING IT TO CONGRESS’S
“POWER TO DISPOSE”
Founding Era sources do not answer the narrow issue addressed in this
article: whether the Property Clause grants Congress the power to indefinitely
own land within a state. The text is fully consistent with both a broad construc-
tion that gives Congress the power to permanently own and a narrow interpre-
tation that imposes a duty to divest. Original intent is likewise ambiguous. The
Founders had no occasion to discuss the issue because the federal government
owned virtually no land within the states.
A. History Supports a Broad Construction of the Power to Dispose
Post-Ratification history, however, strongly supports a broad construction
of Congress’s Power to Dispose. Since the admission of the first public land
state, Congress has always owned vast tracts of land within the states and exer-
cised strict control over their sale. When Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and
Madison were in office, few argued that federal land policy violated the Consti-
tution or the sovereignty of the states.
For nearly two centuries, however, prominent politicians in the public land
states have unsuccessfully advanced a narrow view of Congress’s power when-
445. See Johnson, supra note 3. Law Professors Robert Keiter and John Ruple similarly warn that, R
even if land transfer “is not the blatant rush towards development that many fear, economic
imperatives make anything other than a massive increase in development unrealistic.” ROB-
ERT B. KEITER & JOHN C. RUPLE, WALLACE STEGNER CTR. FOR LAND, RES., & ENV’T,
THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS MOVEMENT: TAKING THE “PUBLIC” OUT OF PUBLIC
LANDS 8 (2015), https://perma.cc/DH39-R2HB.
446. See, e.g., Brian Maffly, Economists: Transferring Federal Lands Could Generate Revenue for
Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/LTL9-7T9E.
447. Congress Puts Public Lands in the Crosshairs, supra note 13; Kristiansen, supra note 13; see also
Siegler, supra note 428; House of Representatives Passes Public Lands Transfer Provision; R
Sportsmen Push Back, BACKCOUNTRY HUNTERS & ANGLERS (Jan. 4, 2017), https://perma
.cc/69AB-283V.
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ever they feel that federal land policies are too restrictive on local interests. The
first clash over the meaning of Congress’s power took place after the economic
downturn of the 1820s, which left many Westerners demanding easier access to
federal land. While most Westerners simply sought reductions in land prices,
some argued that federal land ownership within the states was unconstitutional
because it violated the principle of equal sovereignty. National politicians in
both political parties, however, overwhelmingly rejected the constitutional ar-
gument for cession of federal land. Many even equated Western demands for
cession of the land to the states with the radical and dangerous doctrine of
nullification, as both stressed the primacy of states’ rights. The debates over
cession reveal that, when the issue was first considered, Congress’s Power to
Dispose was widely understood to be limited only by the duty to dispose for the
common benefit. A special House Committee on state cession petitions, for
example, proclaimed that “if any States have, in reality, an unhallowed desire to
get, it may be useful to them to reflect that the other States have the power to
keep, and that it is the duty of the representatives of these to know that if the
national property is parted with, it is parted with only for the general
advantage.”448
The constitutionality of federal landholding reemerged as a pressing na-
tional issue in the early twentieth century after President Franklin D. Roosevelt
withdrew hundreds of millions of acres of federal land from divestiture.449 Like
before, some Westerners argued that restrictive federal land policy violated the
Constitution and the equal sovereignty of the states. These constitutional argu-
ments, however, were not taken seriously outside of the West. Instead, most in
the federal government assumed that Congress had plenary power over the land
and took the side of conservationists who saw it as a resource to be preserved
for the common benefit of all the people of the United States. The Sagebrush
Rebellion of the 1970s, which arose from frustration with federal regulations
that limited the use of federal land, repeated these same dynamics.
Supreme Court precedent also fully supports a broad construction of Con-
gress’s Power to Dispose. Although the Supreme Court did not squarely rule on
the issue during the nineteenth century, it stated in Gratiot that power over the
public lands “is vested in Congress without limitation.”450 In 1911, the Court in
Light squarely held that, as Congress “can withhold or reserve the land, it can
do so indefinitely.”451 The Kleppe Court, moreover, rejected a narrow reading of
Congress’s power and stated that it is “without limitations.”452
448. 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 155, at 796. R
449. See supra text accompanying note 370. R
450. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840).
451. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911).
452. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539–40 (1976).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\42-2\HLE203.txt unknown Seq: 63  3-JUL-18 10:59
2018] Congress’s “Power to Dispose of” the Public Lands 515
The fact that Congress sold virtually all the public land within the early
public land states, moreover, has no bearing on the scope of Congress’s power
under the Property Clause. Originalists who care about original intent look to
what the framers intended the Constitution to mean, not what policies they
thought Congress would use its powers to pursue.453 Although early land policy
was designed to facilitate land sales, Congress—not the states or the courts—
was understood to have had the power to set this policy. Robert Hayne, a
Southern champion of states’ rights during the Nullification Crisis, argued that
although Western desire for access to land “may present strong claims on the
Federal Government for the adoption of a liberal policy towards the new States,
it cannot affect the question of legal or constitutional right.”454
The expectation that Congress would sell the public domain, moreover,
was driven by prevailing social attitudes rather than the original understanding
of Congress’s Property Clause power. Under eighteenth-century thinking, cul-
tivation of the land was “interesting, noble and august,” whereas undeveloped
lands were “barren wilds” or “immense deserts.”455 Environmental conservation
and preservation were unknown concepts in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. The people of the founding generation thus did not expect Congress to
use its powers over the public lands for conservation because they did not un-
derstand the concept of conservation, not because they thought that Congress
lacked the power to do so.
It is also important to recognize that, for all practical purposes, policymak-
ers in the early republic thought Congress would always control vast tracts of
land. As Foot explained when introducing his resolution in 1829, the federal
government sold only about one million acres per year.456 By comparison, the
Louisiana Purchase alone was approximately 530 million acres.457 The early
Congress therefore expected that it would own millions of acres within the
states for the foreseeable future. It is difficult to square this expectation with
any meaningful duty to divest federal land.
B. The Equal Sovereignty Argument
For nearly two centuries, advocates of the narrow view of congressional
power have argued that federal land ownership displaces state sovereignty and
therefore makes the western states unequal to those in the East. Under this
argument, Nevada is not equal to other states because it has sovereignty over
less than half of its territory. The equal sovereignty principle, which the Su-
453. See supra Section I.B.
454. 6 REG. DEB. 34 (1830).
455. Bestor, supra note 55. R
456. See 6 REG. DEB. 3–4 (1829).
457. Louisiana Purchase, 1803, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma
.cc/GME4-36ZH.
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preme Court recently affirmed in Shelby County v. Holder,458 has deep historical
support.459 In fact, state equality was a basic assumption of all parties in the
historical debates over Congress’s Power to Dispose.
Eighteenth century commentators, however, believed that state equality
was perfectly consistent with federal land ownership within a state. The framers
clearly intended for the Property Clause to authorize Congress to reenact the
Northwest Ordinance. The Ordinance, like every subsequent enabling act, both
guarantees that new states will be admitted on an “equal footing” and assumes
that the federal government will continue to own land within the state after
admission.460 James Madison, the “Father of the Constitution,” also declared
that “the known and acknowledged” view of the framers was that Congress
would control the public lands after statehood.461
In fact, giving all federal land to the state governments at statehood would
be antithetical to the framers’ land policy. Starting with the Land Act of 1785,
Congress exercised strict control over land sales to ensure slow, orderly, and
compact settlement in the territories that would be connected to the East and
consistent with republican government.462 Any loss of federal control would
have undermined this system and threatened the Union. As congressmen
pointed out during the debates over cession,463 the equal sovereignty argument
was inconsistent with the land policy of Founders like Washington and Jeffer-
son. As Madison asserted, “a prescriptive sanction of so many years” cannot be
ignored.464
Throughout history, Congress and the courts have responded to the equal
sovereignty argument by contending that federal land ownership does not in-
fringe on state sovereignty. Webster, the “Expounder of the Constitution,”465
declared that federal ownership of the public domain had not “encroached on
the sovereign power of the new States” because the states retained the power to
legislate with respect to the land within their borders.466 In cases like Gratiot,
Pollard, and Stearns, moreover, the Supreme Court likewise held that federal
property ownership is distinct from state sovereignty. In fact, the problem of
dividing sovereignty was a central issue in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
political thought. The American system of federalism was based on the idea
that dividing political power between the states and federal government was not
458. 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013).
459. See Jeffrey Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of Equal State Sovereignty, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 209, 238 (2016).
460. See Transcript of Northwest Ordinance, supra note 85. R
461. See MADISON, supra note 177, at 187–88. R
462. See supra text accompanying notes 79–82. R
463. Speeches, supra note 164. R
464. MADISON, supra note 177, at 188 R
465. See REMINI, supra note 242, at 28–29, 162 (1997). R
466. 13 REG. DEB. 785 (1837).
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only possible, but “a virtue to be celebrated.”467 The federal government’s own-
ership of a disproportionate amount of land in the West, therefore, is no more
constitutionally problematic than the federal government regulating more com-
merce on the eastern seaboard.468
C. The Common Benefit Principle
Congress’s broad power to dispose, however, has always been understood
to be limited by a duty to act for the common benefit. As early as 1776, Mary-
land’s legislature resolved that, because the public lands were obtained with “the
blood and treasure of the United States, such lands ought to be considered as a
common stock.”469 Leading antebellum statesmen such Clay, Buchanan, Web-
ster, and John Quincy Adams agreed. Buchanan, for example, “solemnly pro-
tested against the principle that Congress had any right, in equity or justice, to
give what belonged to the entire people of the Union to the inhabitants of any
State or States whatever.”470 In Dred Scott, moreover, Chief Justice Taney held
that Congress acted as the “trustee” with respect to the territories and thus had
a “duty of promoting the interests of the whole people of the Union.”471
Just as antebellum politicians used the principle to fight off demands for
cession of federal land to the states, twentieth- and twenty-first century com-
mentators have argued that permanent federal ownership is necessary to ensure
that the lands are kept open for common use. The conservation movement was
based on a desire to stop special interests from misusing the public lands for
private gain. President Theodore Roosevelt, for example, stated: “As a people
we have the right and the duty, second to none other but the right and duty of
obeying the moral law, of requiring and doing justice, to protect ourselves and
our children against the wasteful development of our natural resources.”472
When President Hoover proposed giving federal range lands to the states,
moreover, the American Forestry Association declared that it “stands for invio-
late retention of the lands and natural resources which now belong to our peo-
ple as a perpetual and inalienable trust to be used for the common benefit.”473
Today, outdoor recreation groups similarly oppose land transfer to the states on
467. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 6
(2010).
468. As the Court held in Shelby County, the equal sovereignty principle does not require the
federal government to treat all states equally; instead, it merely requires that unequal treat-
ment be “sufficiently related to” differences in fact. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529,
550–51 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204
(2009)).
469. GATES, supra note 12, at 6 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 542 (1838)). R
470. 13 REG. DEB. 731 (1837).
471. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 448 (1857).
472. See Roosevelt, supra note 335. R
473. Hearings, supra note 351. R
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the basis that the public lands are an “American birthright” that “belongs to all
of us.”474
These groups, however, should not rely on the courts to enforce the com-
mon benefit principle against Congress. In Light, the Court stated that “it is
not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Con-
gress to determine.”475 In other words, disposal of federal lands is arguably a
political question because of a “textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”476 Regardless of
whether the courts enforce the common benefit principle, however, history sug-
gests that it should constrain Congress’s disposal power.
CONCLUSION
Founding Era sources do not answer the issue of whether Congress has
the power to permanently own land within a state. Because the federal govern-
ment owned no such land until the nineteenth century, the Confederation and
Founding periods contain little discussion of Congress’s power under the Prop-
erty Clause. The Supreme Court, moreover, did not rule directly on the issue
until the early twentieth century. It is therefore not surprising that legal schol-
arship, which has primarily analyzed only Founding-Era sources, is hopelessly
divided.
Moving beyond the Founding Era reveals that Congress’s Power to Dis-
pose has been broadly construed since at least the 1830s. Whenever federal
policy has restricted access to federal land, prominent Western politicians have
challenged Congress’s power. An overwhelming majority in Congress, however,
has always responded by arguing that its power to own land is limited only by a
duty to act for the common benefit. For more than two-hundred years, com-
mentators have argued that giving federal land to the states would violate this
limitation. Supreme Court doctrine has now supported this construction for
more than a century. Ironically, although many Westerners today argue that
federal landholding violates an originalist understanding of the Constitution,
constitutional history provides more support to the environmentalist groups
that seek to preserve federal land for the common good.
Although history does not necessarily dictate constitutional meaning, such
a long-standing and widely accepted construction of Congress’s Power to Dis-
pose is highly persuasive. As Madison wrote nearly two centuries ago, “the title
in the people of the United States rests on a foundation too just and solid to be
shaken by any technical or metaphysical arguments whatever.”477
474. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
475. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911).
476. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
477. MADISON, supra note 177, at 188.
